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world.  Normal traffic crossing the border would have no content inspected and no record 
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National sovereignty is a foundational principle of national security and the 
modern international system.  This principle is most strongly expressed in connection 
with the laws and practices of nations as they protect their geographical border.  The 
international system, international law and practice, and constitutionally vetted United 
States law clearly recognize the right of the US as a sovereign nation to protect its 
borders and establish systems for controlling goods and people that cross them.  Since 
national sovereignty is such a vital principle, it is a curious aspect of the emerging 21st 
Century world that within the realm of cyberspace most nations, including the United 
States, have either ignored or abdicated the normal responsibility of inspection and 
control regarding data crossing these same boundaries via the Internet.  The central idea 
of this thesis asserts that national sovereignty inherently and logically endows a sovereign 
state, such as the United States, the right to establish an appropriate regime of Internet 
inspection stations.  These stations would be used to inspect suspicious inbound traffic 
and block contraband analogous to the standard inspection regimes used to inspect people 
and goods entering the US through physical borders.  Two questions arise when 
considering this idea.  Are Internet border inspection stations feasible? And would they 
be worthwhile?  This thesis will offer answers to these questions and other related 
questions.   
 
B. INTERNET HISTORY AND CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
If national sovereignty is as clear and important a principal as is argued here, then 
why has it not been asserted in the form of Internet border inspection stations up to this 
point?  Chapter II will seek to provide an answer to this question by examining the 
history and path of development of the early Internet.  Understanding the way the early 
Internet developed will show why there has been little consideration of asserting national 
sovereignty, and no consideration of Internet border inspections until now.  It will explain 
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why the current environment makes the question meaningful and relevant today.  The 
Internet was initially built by researchers and academics who established the early 
structures without any significant thought about borders.  Their primary goal was to build 
a communication architecture that would facilitate the free flow of ideas and reliably 
transport data.  The Internet has changed from this early environment into the current 
environment, in which security concerns play a central role. 
Chapter II will also describe how national sovereignty has been asserted in 
cyberspace in two forms other than Internet border inspection.  It has been asserted by the 
United States and other countries in the form of legal jurisdiction related to the Internet, 
and by some authoritarian regimes in the form of controlling what would be considered in 
the United States to be protected speech.  Chapter II will also describe some other 
important trends in asserting national sovereignty on the Internet including the current US 
National Cyber Security Strategy.   
 
C. THE CASE FOR INTERNET BORDER INSPECTION 
After establishing the history and the path of development of the Internet and the 
ways that national sovereignty has been asserted on the Internet, the groundwork will 
have been laid to build the case for Internet inspection at the border.  Chapter III will 
build this case by first laying out the principle that it is logical to use legal precedents set 
in the physical world to derive principles for the Internet.  Examples from case law that 
show this will be described. In O’Connor v. Ortega, a search was conducted on an 
individual’s office including the desk and file cabinets1.  This case had nothing to do with 
computers but was later used extensively as having established the precedent for 
determining the threshold for needing a warrant for cases in which criminal searches 
were conducted on government property, including computer hard drives and information 
stored on computer networks.  Similarly, other cases have established precedent for 
communications media like mail and telephones, and these precedents have been used to 
provide legal guidance for communications on the Internet.   
                                                 
1 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 US 709 (1987) 
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After establishing that there is firm legal ground for using legal precedents 
established in the physical world and extending them to the realm of cyberspace, we will 
look at the current physical inspection regime at the borders of people and goods.  The 
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, formerly the US Customs Service, is 
charged with the role of inspecting goods as they cross the border.  In this role they can 
potentially inspect every good that legally crosses the border.  Even though they do not in 
fact inspect every good, they examine a small but significant percentage of all goods.  
Since they have the right to inspect all goods, but lack the resources to inspect all, they 
only inspect those goods that arouse a “reasonable suspicion”.  The source of this 
suspicion can come from unusual information in customs documents or from intelligence 
information.  This targeted approach attempts to strike the best balance between keeping 
out illegal goods, such as drugs and illegal weapons, and not significantly impeding the 
high volume of legitimate goods crossing the border.  This physical model can be used to 
derive a principle of inspecting Internet traffic, which can include information goods of 
real value like software and music that cross the border via the Internet.  The high volume 
of physical goods that cross the border can be compared to the high volume of Internet 
traffic crossing the border, where there is a corresponding need to minimize Internet 
inspections to those based on intelligence or other specific legally vetted criteria to ensure 
that legitimate Internet traffic is not significantly impeded.  The physical inspection 
model will be used to derive appropriate principles, which are then applied to the 
Internet. Another physical world analogy that uses inspections is the processes for 
allowing persons to cross the border.  The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (BCIS), formerly known as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 
has the authority and responsibility to inspect persons who seek to legally cross the 
borders of the United States.  One of the primary goals of this policy is to keep out 
criminals and other undesirable persons from coming into the US.  Criminals can 
“virtually” cross the US border by using the Internet, bypassing normal BCIS procedures; 
and then use computer tools to break into computers and commit crimes including 
trespass, theft, fraud, or other malicious activity on computers and against victims located 
within US borders, even though the criminal remains physically outside the US when 
they are initiating this activity.  This ability to cross the border is narrow but significant, 
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and the relevance will be described as it relates to Internet border inspections.  Both the 
Customs and BCIS models of inspection will be described in more detail, and applied to 
build the case for establishing an Internet border inspection.   
Even though there are important and useful analogies for inspection at the borders 
in physical space that could be used for formulating the appropriate structures for border 
inspection in cyberspace, there are of course some significant differences between 
physical space and cyberspace.  The physical metaphors are useful and even can serve as 
legal precedent but they are not exact analogs.  The final part of Chapter III will discuss 
some of the most significant differences.  Wiretap laws and telephone systems also are 
models from which legal precedent and logical analogies can be derived for cyberspace.  
A telephone can be used as an instrument of crime, but most telephone crime occurs 
during the course of a telephone conversation.  There are exceptions that might involve 
voicemail but non-conversational based telephone crime does not compare in scale to the 
hacker activity on the Internet.  Hackers can much more directly engage in trespass, theft, 
espionage, or destruction, without anyone on the other end being aware of the crime at 
the time.  The similarities and differences between the telephone network and the Internet 
will be discussed.  This section will also discuss the relevance of these similarities and 
differences as they apply to border inspection.   
After having discussed the physical world models and the ways they can be used 
to derive and set legal precedent for a model of inspection in cyberspace, Chapter III will 
discuss current real structures on the Internet.  Precedents have already been set by laws 
for devices like network firewalls, which are used by various users and enterprises on the 
Internet.  Precedents such as this will be discussed to explore how legal and technical 
structures already on the Internet could be applied at a national level rather than just a 
local level.  Network firewalls do function as a local network boundary inspection 
station, and often much more, but it will be useful to describe the similarities and 
differences between national Internet border inspection and the function of firewalls.  
From all the examples given in Chapter III a case will be built describing the logic of 
Internet border inspection. 
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D. USES OF INTERNET BORDER INSPECTION 
Once a logical case has been built to establish a precedent for border inspection in 
cyberspace, the case begs the question: “What would such an inspection station be used 
for?“  If such inspection is not necessary or useful, then it would not be rational to put 
such a structure in place.  It is useful to emphasize the point that Internet border 
inspection could be used for abuse or it could be designed for very beneficial purposes.  
A general implementation with some specific characteristics will be described in this 
thesis.  The design would seek to minimize the potential for abuse while still obtaining 
significant potential benefits.  The idea of establishing a national level system that could 
monitor some traffic on the Internet conjures up in many the fear that it could be used for 
some nefarious Orwellian purpose to keep tabs on the activities of normal users of the 
Internet.  The structure proposed in this thesis would be based on inspecting Internet 
traffic only from specific foreign Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.  The implementation 
would not examine the content of any traffic crossing the border except the traffic from 
legally vetted foreign Internet addresses.  The overwhelming majority of Internet traffic 
would pass the inspection station without any examination of content and without any 
record of its passing.  This proposed structure is a stark contrast to the implementation of 
Internet controls established by authoritarian regimes.  Regimes such as China have 
established extensive measures to monitor and control access of their citizens as they 
connect to the Internet.  Some critics have euphemistically called this the “Great Firewall 
of China”.  The restrictive policies and intent of the Chinese system have been used to 
restrict free communication of political ideas and monitor and restrict the communication 
of peaceful political opposition groups.   
There is no intent in this proposal to use Internet border inspection stations to 
restrict or even monitor legitimate Internet traffic, just like it is not the intent of US 
Customs to monitor or restrict traffic in legitimate goods.  The intent of this Internet 
border inspection proposal would be to support properly judicially reviewed and 
appropriately overseen legitimate inspection, law enforcement, and intelligence activities.  
A later chapter will describe some of the technical and administrative measures that 
would work to prevent the abuse of this system.   
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Just as US Customs tries to prevent contraband from crossing the border for 
physical goods such as drugs, the Internet border inspections could prevent contraband 
such as child pornography from crossing the border by blocking Internet traffic crossing 
the border from known child pornography sites.  Such a measure would not prevent all 
child pornography from entering the United States, but it could be used to gain a 
significant new ability to counter the volumes of child pornography currently crossing the 
border via the Internet.   
Another way that Internet inspection could be used is similar to the way physical 
searches detecting contraband are used.  Sometimes Federal Agents working for Customs 
do not block contraband from coming into the US, but instead they allow the contraband 
to cross while they keep it under surveillance to determine the intended recipient.  A 
similar method could be used to follow Internet contraband to the person requesting it to 
aid in legitimate investigation and prosecution of criminals.  It also could be used to 
monitor Internet communications crossing the border from foreign Internet addresses 
which had been reviewed through due process legal procedures and determined to be 
involved in communication between terrorist leaders or hostile foreign powers outside the 
United States to their operatives inside the US.  Imagine US Federal Agents being able to 
monitor Internet traffic from a particular Internet address of Al Q’aida controllers in a 
foreign country to all of their operatives inside the US.  Currently if a terrorist operative 
has been identified inside the US and a request for monitoring the operative’s 
communications passes through a due process legal review, then Law Enforcement 
investigators could monitor all communication to and from the operative only, they could 
not monitor all communication from the controller in the foreign country, but only the 
communication to the single identified operative.  It would be a boon to law enforcement 
if they could identify a communications point such as an IP address in a foreign country 
used by hostile agents.  They could then identify all the Internet communication the 
hostile agents were sending into the US by watching for Internet traffic crossing the US 
border from that hostile IP address.  This hypothetical scenario would include full due 
process to ensure legitimate Internet traffic that crosses the border would by default not 
be monitored at all as was previously described.  Chapter III will also include a 
description of some other ways the Internet inspection process could potentially be used 
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for legitimate assertion of national sovereignty as well to include blocking of hostile 
Internet addresses and the potential implementation of information embargoes against 
hostile powers.  
 
E. FEASIBILITY OF INSPECTION 
An idea may be logically derived in principle and even potentially useful, but if 
the idea is technically or legally infeasible then it amounts to fantasy or science fiction.  
Chapter IV will examine technical feasibility of Internet border inspection, Chapter V 
will examine the legal feasibility, and Chapter VI will discuss important issues related to 
political feasibility.   
Chapter IV is not intended to be a technical paper and will not delve into low-
level technical details.  It will describe some of the high level issues and the principles of 
technical implementation.  There are some with technical backgrounds who will 
understand the nature of the Internet’s structure and even some of the details of the 
equipment that passes the data from place to place around the globe in a manner that 
largely ignores legal structures such as national borders.  There are others who have legal 
or political backgrounds who are not familiar with the technical details.  We will seek to 
strike a balance by explaining the key high-level technical aspects to those who are not 
familiar with such aspects without going into too much technical detail.  At the same time 
we will point out the key technical aspects that show that this idea is technically feasible.  
Technical issues that will be addressed include a discussion of the structure of the 
Internet backbones such as the trans-oceanic cables and other backbone elements that 
cross the border, where Internet border inspection stations could be set up; and the 
handling of the packets of data in that structure.  Almost all packets would pass through 
the inspection station without any content being examined and no information from 
legitimate packets would be retained.  Only packets from previously identified suspicious 
sources would be examined in accordance with appropriate legal procedures.  These and 
related details will be examined in the discussion of technical feasibility. 
Chapter V examines the legal feasibility.  This will not be a detailed legal brief, 
but should provide a framework for examining the key legal issues and will provide some 
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additional understanding for readers who are less familiar with some of the legal issues 
related to the Internet.  This examination will look at both, the key constitutional 
provisions that relate to border inspection and communication such as the Internet, and 
how a technical implementation of this idea would avoid overly broad inspection to 
ensure protection of constitutional rights.  Chapter V will also examine the international 
law framework dealing with cybercrime to show that there is no current legal bar to 
implementation from this realm.  Since the current laws within the United States are not 
currently sufficient to implement Internet border inspection, some of the changes in the 
law needed for implementation will also be described.  
 
F. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY 
Political solutions are not as precisely analyzed as technical solutions, but are just 
as vital to implementation.  Chapter VI will discuss the importance of the political 
aspects, and will identify the key political issues that will need to be considered while 
designing a system for Internet border inspection.  Issues of privacy and free speech are 
considered in the context of this proposal.  Some will fear that implementation of this 
structure will be like the establishment of an American version of the “Great Firewall of 
China”, which is used to restrict free expression.  We will describe why this structure is 
fundamentally different and how it can provide a net benefit rather than a net detriment to 
the national interest of Americans.  Another issue that will be discussed is the role of 
proper legal oversight and training in preventing potential abuse.  Politics of course can 
extend beyond the borders of a country and there is likely to be some significant 
resistance from certain international actors outside the United States if the US were to 
assert its national sovereignty even more explicitly on the Internet.  The United States is 
already an information superpower, and it plays a dominant role on the Internet.  Exerting 
national-level controls on Internet traffic would increase US power over the Internet.  
Some nations are concerned about the growth of US power and may feel threatened by 
the US building up even more.  Chapter VI will discuss such issues and how they might 
be addressed.  If such concerns are not adequately dealt with up front, the whole idea may 
be held back indefinitely.   
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 G. CONCLUSION 
Chapter VII will discuss some of the overall conclusions and provide policy 
recommendations.  It will also point out areas that this paper could not address in 
appropriate detail.  These areas are ripe for further discussion or study 
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II. INTERNET HISTORY AND CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
Although sovereign states have the right to inspect traffic in people and goods 
crossing its borders, traffic on the Internet has not been inspected.  This thesis asserts that 
logical precedent can be derived from inspection of people and goods and applied to the 
Internet.  But if this is as clear a principle as asserted here then it is important to 
understand why inspection has not yet been implemented.  To understand this it is 
necessary to understand the historical development of the Internet.  This is not an 
exhaustive history but rather one that describes the path of development and motives of 
those who contributed to building the Internet.  The goal is to explain why development 
did not at first lead naturally toward the notion of applying the principles of security and 
national sovereignty, but instead at first emphasized other principles such as the free 
sharing of ideas, and later privacy.  It is easy to see that in recent years the costs and 
value of resources on the Internet have fundamentally changed the nature of the Internet 
from the academic and research environment where it was born, into an Internet where 
huge economic and security interests now play an increasingly central role.  While it was 
not originally a place that may have needed inspections at the borders, it is now an 
environment where such ideas deserve more serious consideration.  This chapter will also 
describe the current conventional wisdom concerning the Internet related to border 
inspection.   
 
A. BRIEF INTERNET HISTORY  
The concepts leading to the Internet were developed in the early 1960’s by 
researchers and academics working under contract for the Department of Defense (DOD).  
DOD delegated the work to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).  ARPA 
was the central agency sponsoring the research and much of the initial work was done for 
ARPA by RAND Corporation, a defense think tank.  There were two motives initially for 
building the structure that became the Internet.  The first was to build a 
telecommunications command and control structure that could survive a nuclear attack.  
The second was to be able to share the scarce computer resources in that period among 
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researchers and academics across an all-digital network.  One of the first documents 
describing this was written by Paul Baran at RAND in 1964, “On Distributed 
Communication”2.  This document described these motives and discussed key technical 
details such as the multi-path packet switched data network that formed the Internet.  The 
RAND document states “the Memorandum is directed toward examining the use of 
redundancy as one means of building communications systems to withstand heavy enemy 
attacks.”  It goes on to establish “The requirements for a future all-digital-data distributed 
network which provides common user service for a wide range of users having different 
requirements is considered”.3  This document described the foundational concepts that 
would eventually be developed into the architecture of the Internet.  It is important to 
note that these initial steps of development envisioned a network that would be built 
within the US borders, and thus there was no need to even consider border inspection.  In 
addition, the second goal of sharing computer resources set the path toward openness and 
trust, again without regard to borders or inspection.   
In 1966 the plans for the ARPANET had been developed and by 1969 DOD had 
built ARPANET, a network used to conduct research on computer networking.  By the 
end of the year ARPANET had four nodes up and running.  This was a single 
geographically dispersed network, but it was not yet a network of networks, or Internet. 
However ARPANET and the networks built from the same principles would become the 
backbone of the Internet, thereby establishing a precedent for a structure based on 
openness and trust.   
In 1971 ARPANET had grown to 15 sites with 23 host computers.  The network 
was used for remote login, file sharing and data transport between hosts, and electronic 
mail.  Email emphasized its nature as a communications medium for research, rather than 
its nature as a communications medium for military command and control, and became 
one of the most popular features of the network.  Email traversing the network allowed 
for the potential exchange of private information.  Privacy may not have been an 
important concern at this point of development, but later privacy advocates would be very 
concerned about the private nature of some communications, such as email.   
                                                 
2 Paul Baran. On Distributed Communications. 1964, RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA.  
3 Ibid. Preface & Summary. 
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Development continued and more site nodes and computer hosts were added.  The 
driving principles of research, openness, and trust continued; and in 1974 the first 
international borders were crossed when the University College of London, England, was 
connected to ARPANET.  Research was the goal, and because there was no economic 
traffic, criminal activity, or contraband, there was no reason to consider international 
border inspections.  The primary boundary of national sovereignty had been crossed 
without a real need or significant consideration for border inspection, and this helped set 
a precedent for treating Internet traffic differently from people and goods that cross the 
same physical borders.  Significantly the primary connections between the nodes of the 
ARPANET were dedicated telephone lines used for data only.  This also helped to 
establish the precedent that computer networks were a communications medium, more 
like the telephone than a medium where information goods, like software and music, 
would later cross legal boundaries on a routine basis.  It was primarily just a 
communications medium at the time, but it grew to become much more.  Now it is a 
medium where goods and contraband can cross borders, and crimes can be committed 
without any check at the borders.  The interpersonal communication aspect of the 
ARPANET was shown to be a growing part of the network in the results of a 1973 ARPA 
study, which showed email composed 75% of all ARPANET traffic4.   
The structure of networked computers was expanded to the commercial sector in 
1974 when the company BBN opened Telenet, the first public packet data service.  BBN 
was originally started as a research team led by MIT professors Richard Bolt, Leo 
Beranek, and Robert Newman.  The BBN team built key components of the early 
ARPANET, and members of the expanded team continued to play key roles in the early 
development of ARPANET and other networks like it. 
By 1979 the expanding network structure began to show other moves away from 
its original research purposes.  At this time USENET was established, which set up a 
news group service.  This service collected messages related to a specific topic that any 
user could access, and this service expanded to encompass a vast array of topics.  
Entertainment debuted with the first multi-user computer game called MUD, also known 
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as MUD1.  In this period of the mid-70’s a new phase began and the motives for further 
development began to change.  This started the network that would soon be called the 
Internet down a path that was more commercial, and away from the almost pure research 
or national defense origins of the ARPANET.   
At the same time the physical structure of the Internet was expanding the software 
and technical standards were being developed.  The protocol for sending data across these 
networks had developed over the years and in 1982 DOD decided to change from the 
older Network Control Protocol to the newer Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP).  This was a protocol that would increasingly be used across the 
ARPANET and is still the primary method of sending data across the Internet.5  Since 
TCP/IP was implemented to facilitate the transmission of information from one network 
to another this could be described as a change that marked the beginning of a true 
”Internet”, and this is when the term was first used.  Also in 1982 four European 
countries created new cross border connections as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Sweden built the European UNIX Network (EUnet).  In this time period 
the same conditions existed which had previously made international borders a barely 
significant consideration, and inspection was still almost certainly not even a passing 
thought.  
As the year 1984 arrived, the Internet had grown to 1,000 host computers and 
connected networks across several countries.  During this year many people reflected on 
George Orwell’s fictional setting of total authoritarian world domination, and almost 
perpetual surveillance using modern technologies described in his book “1984”.6  The 
Internet had not taken on any of the aspects of Orwell’s dystopia at this time, but critics 
of government involvement in the Internet would later use Orwellian terms such as “Big 
Brother” to voice their concerns about the potential for oppressive government 
surveillance on the Internet.  1984 was also the year that Russia connected to USENET, 
which by now also included West Germany, Japan, and South Korea.  Also in this year 
the author William Gibson wrote the book Neuromancer and coined the word 
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“Cyberspace”.7   Personal computers were becoming affordable to a growing mass of 
home users.  While most home users did not typically connect to the Internet per se, a 
parallel community of computer bulletin boards was being built by individual computer 
users with modems who allowed others to dial directly into their computer to share 
information, play games, and engage in other activities.  There was a significant and 
growing amount of private information both on the Internet and in bulletin board systems 
(BBSs).  Later these communities would merge as dial up connections to the Internet 
became more commonly available and the type of content once put on bulletin boards 
began to be accessible on the Internet.  Still at this time minimal security was in place in 
many parts of the Internet.  Good network computer citizenship was a primary source of 
security on the Internet, and strong computer security was not a primary consideration in 
most software development efforts.  Another significant change occurred when the 
administration of the ARPANET backbone structure was turned over to the National 
Science Foundation.  The ARPANET had grown far beyond the DOD’s original structure 
for military research, and survivable command and control.  Now this structure would be 
managed more like a public asset than a military network.   
Before the end of the decade two events would occur that would highlight a new 
need for security on the Internet: the Morris Internet Worm in 1988 and the Hanover 
Hackers in 1989.  By 1987 the number of hosts on the Internet had grown to 10,000, and 
passed 100,000 by 1989.8  This virtual explosion of new users changed the character of 
the normal Internet user.  The normal user had been part of the community of academics 
and researchers who took responsibility and good network citizenship more or less 
seriously.  The new users were much more often curious high school or college students, 
and some of these took responsibility and network citizenship as challenges to be 
circumvented, not embraced.  This change allowed the curious computer savvy individual 
without necessarily any research, academic, or other official position to connect and join 
the growing mass of users.  In this mass user environment they could expect to be more 
anonymous than ever before.  This anonymity was not really a part of the early Internet, 
which was built on research and openness standards.  But in the growing mass of users at 
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this time, anonymity became part of the Internet culture, and it would remain a part of the 
culture from that time forward.  This sense of anonymity motivates many otherwise law-
abiding citizens to go poking around corners of the Internet where they are not allowed.  
Some later go on to engage in criminal hacker activity.  The sense of anonymity was 
definitely a factor in the thinking of Robert Morris when he released his self-replicating 
Internet worm that overloaded very large parts of the Internet in 1988.  It was an even 
stronger factor in the Hanover Hackers starting their espionage activity, as they gained 
unauthorized access to numerous sensitive computer systems and copied files for East 
German intelligence handlers.9  These events showed some people that the Internet 
environment of freedom and openness now required more substantial security measures.  
However, even though some were convinced of the need for security, the culture would 
only gradually change over the next decade.  Attacks were felt by some to be bad Internet 
citizenship and aberrations, not necessarily the shape of things to come.   
The community of individuals concerned about free speech and privacy on the 
Internet had grown significantly by 1990 and a formal organization, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF), was established with the goal of protecting civil liberties on 
the Internet.  The efforts of the EFF along with other groups helped propel the Internet 
down the path of emphasizing civil liberties.  The year 1990 also saw the first 
commercial provider of Internet dial-up access.  This would start the merger of the 
bulletin board community with the Internet community.  Many people were already part 
of both communities, but the growing number of home personal computers with modems 
could now start to connect directly to the Internet.   
Starting in 1990 and continuing through 1991, as the US reacted to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, five hackers from the Netherlands established computer connections 
across international borders and broke into computers at 34 American military sites.10  
They gathered information on locations of US troops and ships, and other information of 
military importance.  Some accounts allege that they offered to sell this information to 
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Iraq.11  US investigators identified the individuals they believed were responsible, but the 
hackers could not be prosecuted, because the Netherlands, where they lived and initiated 
the crime, did not have laws against such intrusions at the time.  National sovereignty 
was asserted to protect the citizens of one country from being prosecuted by another 
country, even though the individuals had electronically crossed the border, connected to 
computers, and stolen information on US soil.  This event illustrates one of the primary 
ways the principle of national sovereignty has been most consistently asserted related to 
the Internet, in the form of establishing legal jurisdiction for crimes and investigations.  It 
also highlights the potential importance of security on the Internet.  Security had been an 
important concern to a very small but important community of experts in the Internet 
community before this time, but this community had grown significantly by this time.  
Despite this, security would not be an important issue in the awareness of most users until 
much later. 
The World Wide Web was developed in 1991 by researchers at CERN, the 
European Organization for Nuclear Research.  This event would lead to expansion in the 
popularity of connecting to the Internet beyond a relatively small population, who 
enjoyed the technical nature of the Internet, to a mass of less technically oriented users.  
The Internet up to this time was almost entirely composed of text based content and 
programs.  With the advent of the Web, users would begin to interact with the Internet in 
what would develop into the now familiar “point and click” environment.  Though many 
technical people are aware that the Web is just one application running on the Internet, a 
vast portion of those who use the Web think of the Web and the Internet as being the 
same thing.  There are of course many other aspects of the Internet besides the Web.  
Even non-technical users use applications such as email that typically use different 
services for sending information.  The importance of the distinction is not about the 
technical aspects but more about the users who connect to the Internet.  The vast majority 
do not understand or care about the technical details taking place behind the scenes.  The 
technical tools and techniques used for criminal activity are also not of interest to them.  
They are more concerned with privacy and free access.  These users also connect to web 
sites either more or less aware of their anonymity. They are even advised for privacy 
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purposes to remain anonymous.  Establishment of Internet inspection at the border will 
probably be uncomfortable to such users, even if it will be unlikely to impact them at all.  
Only if they have a good understanding of the idea and the current threat will they be 
likely to consider it palatable.   
The development and expansion of the Web and the growing number of people 
connecting to the Internet began to catch the attention of businesses and the news media 
by 1993.  This period could be described as a new phase of the Internet.  It would be from 
this time forward that commercial interests would grow to dominate the Internet.  Now e-
commerce represents countless billions of dollars of total value depending on how you 
appraise the infrastructure.  By 1994 Web traffic had become the 2nd most popular service 
on the Internet, and it would be the most popular service by 1995.12  1994 would be the 
year that the first cyber-bank would open for business, representing the ability to directly 
conduct monetary transactions.  1995 would see a number of Internet related companies 
enter the stock market as Initial Public Offerings.  Netscape would be the third largest 
ever IPO share value at the time.  The commercial aspect of the net was rapidly 
developing. 
The vast expansion of the Internet in new countries and the growth of content on 
the Web led a number of countries to assert their national authority by restricting access 
to the Internet.  By 1996 certain oppressive regimes had placed restrictions on political 
and religious content.  This is significant because it represents the beginning of a trend 
for nations asserting more strongly their national sovereignty on the Internet, in a new 
form that was more than just legal jurisdiction.  Like all government assertion of national 
sovereignty, authority can be used for purposes that appropriately balance freedom and 
security, or it can be used for oppression.  The principle of asserting national authority 
without consideration of its purpose is morally neutral.  The purposes and ends can make 
it morally good or bad.  Nonetheless nations started in this period to more strongly assert 
their sovereignty and authority, and this trend has continued. 
Many developments occurred over the next few years but most were 
continuations of trends already identified previously or they were of a more technical 
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nature.  In 1999 two events helped mark the growing importance of security in 
Cyberspace, the release of the “Melissa” virus, and the “information war” that was waged 
between US led NATO forces and their sympathizers against Yugoslavian Serb forces 
and their sympathizers regarding Kosovo.  Computer viruses, and other malicious code, 
had been part of the Internet environment since the “Morris Worm”, but that event had 
impacted the Internet community when it still was largely composed of researchers and 
academics.  The “Melissa” virus was an event that impacted a greatly expanded 
population of computer users and organizations.  The Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) located at Carnegie Mellon University described the impact.   
The Melissa virus represents a new level of sophistication in the 
progression of computer viruses. Melissa’s impact is so great because it 
exploits, in a very simple and clever way, the power that has been built 
into the flexible and expressive technologies in use on the Internet today. 
It also exploits the high level of connectivity brought about by the Internet 
and the informal rules people commonly use when handling electronic 
mail.13 
The US Department of Justice in December 1999 received a guilty plea to federal 
and state charges from the creator of the virus, David Smith, and reported the estimated 
damages at more than $80 million.  Robert Cleary, the US Attorney who led prosecution 
of the case, stated, “The Melissa virus demonstrated the danger that business, government 
and personal computer users everywhere face in our technological society…  Far from 
being a mere nuisance, Melissa infected computers and disabled computer networks 
throughout North America.”14  A key impact of “Melissa” was that it brought security 
concerns into the mass consciousness of average Internet users.  Internet security moved 
from being just an abstract idea, to an issue that had real and tangible impacts on many 
individuals at the same time from a single source.   
In the same year, the US military led NATO forces in Operation Allied Force, a 
campaign to stop Serbian forces that sought to push the ethnic Albanian majority out of 
the territory in Yugoslavia known as Kosovo.  This military action was primarily 
conducted in the form of a NATO air campaign of precision bombing.  However a small 
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but significant part of the military strategy and tactics of both sides included the use of 
methods referred to in the US as “information warfare”.  This term meant many things 
when it was used at the time, and these are not discussed here, but it included the use of 
cyberspace to gain military and diplomatic advantage.  Both sides conducted information 
operations on the Internet.  Hackers sympathetic to the Serbian cause conducted denial of 
service attacks on US and NATO Internet sites, and defaced other web pages with 
content expressing anti-US and anti-NATO sentiments.  The Serbian government 
controlled content on many web pages and other media within their border for 
propaganda purposes.  US forces also used the Internet to get out its messages through 
web pages and email to support public affairs and psychological operations. 15  All of this 
activity was significant in the context of this analysis, because national sovereignty was 
expressed again in a new form in cyberspace, this time in the form of countries using the 
Internet in support of military and diplomatic objectives during a time of war. 
Security awareness in the community of Internet users has now moved from a 
peripheral interest to an issue of central importance in the last several years.  Some of the 
events that demonstrate this are the reactions to the various major computer virus events, 
which have regularly impacted Internet operations for individuals and organizations 
worldwide.  The year 2001 had several major malicious software events including “Code 
Red”, “Nimda”, “Sir Cam”, and “BadTrans”.  Partly as a reaction to these and other virus 
and computer hacking incidents, significant changes have been made on the part of 
software developers to make security a more central concern in software development.  
Microsoft announced in Jan 2002 that it would make “trustworthy computing” the highest 
company priority.16   
Another event occurred outside of cyberspace in 2001 that has had important 
implications for security and asserting national sovereignty.  The attack on the United 
States on September 11, 2001 by international terrorists would have profound 
implications both outside cyberspace and within.  The results of this highlighted the 
importance of security to the people from the top levels of government to the common 
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citizen of the United States, and for many people around the world.  The US government 
responded in two key ways related first to the Internet, and second to national border 
inspections.  The first was the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.17  This act 
significantly updated laws related to investigating terrorism, but also updated laws related 
to the Internet.  These changes streamlined certain legal procedures and changed the way 
intelligence investigations and criminal investigations could be coordinated.  The USA 
PATRIOT Act aided law enforcement officials significantly in investigating terrorism 
and other crime both in and out of cyberspace.  The US government also reevaluated the 
importance of border inspections for both people and goods.  A new cabinet level 
position was created and a major reorganization of governmental structures was 
implemented creating the Department of Homeland Security.  These changes mark a very 
significant increase in the importance of security and inspection procedures at the 
borders.   
In summary this history has described the current environment in which 
inspection of Internet traffic at the borders will be considered.  The Internet initially was 
established on a path of openness without regard to borders.  It developed as an 
increasingly important mode of communication in which privacy was a growing 
consideration.  It continued to grow as an increasingly important commercial interest in 
which security was seen as a secondary concern to progress.  Crime and malicious logic 
started and grew on the Internet and security became more important.  While the initial 
and early path of development did not need to concern itself with borders and 
inspections, the current environment is one in which ideas like this need new 
consideration. 
 
B. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM  
A review of the history of the Internet provides some understanding of the 
conventional wisdom regarding the appropriate role of government and inspection on the 
Internet.  It is important for this thesis to point out that there are two perspectives in 
evaluating the current conventional wisdom.  There is a broad perspective which 
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examines the larger issues related to government surveillance, which are currently being 
debated in discussions about the USA Patriot Act18 and the research on Total Information 
Awareness19 project.  And there is a narrow perspective, which would examine 
conventional wisdom on the specific issue of Internet border inspections.  From the broad 
perspective there is a significant amount of debate, and a significant body of conventional 
wisdom from opposing sides of the debate.  As for the narrow perspective, there has been 
almost nothing written about this specific topic.  All conventional wisdom would be 
derived from the broader debate and consideration of ideas discussed in this thesis.   
1. Conventional Wisdom: The Broad Perspective 
The historical review describing the initial development of the Internet showed 
that the Internet was established as a place of openness and free sharing of ideas without 
consideration of border inspections.  This has been extended by some into the idea that 
the Internet is something completely new and outside the normal paradigms of law and 
communication.  One privacy advocate, John Barlow, described this view in a 1996 Time 
magazine article. 
The real issue is control.  The Internet is too widespread to be easily 
dominated by any single government.  By creating a seamless global-
economic zone, borderless and unregulatable, the Internet calls into 
question the very idea of a nation-state.  No wonder nation-states are 
rushing to get their levers of control into cyberspace while less than 1% of 
the world's population is online.20 
Those with opinions that oppose or question the government’s ability to even 
attempt to monitor Internet communication have been organized into groups like the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which Barlow co-founded, and the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC), among others.21   
There is another large part of the Internet community that is strongly concerned 
about the security on the Internet.  While small in the early seventies, this community has 
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grown into a diverse, multi-billion dollar per year computer security industry.22  Perhaps 
because of its size and diversity, the security industry has not produced a consensus of 
opinion on the proper role of government monitoring.  Some support a strong role for 
government in providing security and others see a greater role for the private sector in 
providing security.  These solutions are not mutually exclusive, and in fact can be very 
complementary.  But there can be a significant difference of opinion. 
From all the diverse opinions, three general positions may be described.  The first 
group is composed of privacy advocates who have great concern about the government’s 
ability to monitor, particularly in light of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Total 
Information Awareness project.  The second group is made up of security advocates who 
support enhanced laws to update and streamline the technology and due process 
procedures used to investigate crime on the Internet.  The third opinion group, also 
security advocates, seek private and local solutions to security challenges as opposed to 
government solutions.  Though they are not necessarily in strong opposition to the 
government, they may believe in at least minimizing the role of government surveillance 
as a solution.  The US government tried to find a consensus of opinion on security at 
large as it developed the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.23  This document 
describes a wide range of cyber security measures that can be taken at many levels, from 
governments and international cooperation, to organizations and business, and down to 
the individual level, encouraging private users to increase the security of their own 
computer systems.  This document describes security monitoring on the Internet in terms 
of gathering data and reports of hostile activity, and seeks to do this as a cooperative 
effort between the public and private sector in a structure they call the National 
Cyberspace Security Response System.  The strategy tries to address the concerns of 
privacy advocates as well by appointing a Privacy Officer who will oversee and address 
privacy concerns, and it seeks to cultivate other cooperative efforts between the public 
and private sectors.  The National Strategy document and consensus approach do not 
significantly address the role of government in monitoring per se, and the strategy does 
not even consider the idea of Internet border inspection.   
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 2. Conventional Wisdom: The Narrow Perspective 
The conventional wisdom related to the specific idea of Internet border inspection 
can be summarized fairly succinctly.  A review of literature revealed that some have 
written about the ideas of national sovereignty and the Internet.24  This literature 
primarily addresses legal jurisdiction or addresses larger political science considerations.  
There is a larger body of writing which deals with matters regarding national security, 
which specifically addresses information operations or information warfare, and this 
describes government roles in national defense on the Internet, but this literature does not 
significantly address the specific role of Internet border inspection.  Another body of 
writing has described the policies of authoritarian countries like China that have 
established a national infrastructure to monitor and block Internet access with the intent 
of limiting freedom of political expression and organization.  Other countries prohibit 
Internet access to sites that offend government political or religious sensibilities.  The 
literature search did not uncover anything that specifically addressed the issue of Internet 
border inspection within the US.  Only one article was found that described defining 
“Electronic Borders” on a national scale within the United States for security purposes.25  
Experts who were interviewed during the course of research for this topic, who are 
familiar with issues of Internet security, often expressed opinions related to the technical, 
legal, or political difficulties of implementation, but none identified any significant 
literature on the topic. 
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III. THE LOGICAL CASE FOR BORDER INSPECTION  
The logic of establishing Internet border inspection is built by extending current 
legal concepts that apply to physical border inspections to cyberspace.  This chapter will 
build a logical case for Internet border inspection and describe how such a system might 
be used.  Descriptions of legal principles are not intended to be a formal legal analysis 
but rather to provide a general understanding of the relevant ideas.  This chapter will not 
address all of the legal aspects that would need to be considered before establishing such 
a system; a more detailed discussion is deferred until Chapter V.  This chapter will also 
not address all of the technical issues, leaving those for Chapter IV.   
 
A. THE LOGICAL CASE FOR BORDER INSPECTION 
1. National Sovereignty 
The idea of Internet border inspections rests upon the fundamental principle of 
national sovereignty.  The current international system, and the structure of national laws, 
including the United States Constitution, broadly recognizes this principle.  National 
sovereignty was established as a foundational part of the international system in the 
negotiations of the peace treaty of Westphalia, which was the settlement at the end of the 
Thirty Years War in Europe in 1648.26  This set up a kind of ‘golden rule’ of the 
international community among sovereign states.  The specific nature of the principle of 
national sovereignty has changed somewhat since that time, but still remains a foundation 
of the modern international system.  States that have achieved international recognition 
are acknowledged as having sovereign rights at their borders and in all territory within.  
This idea has a vast array of implications, most of which do not apply to this discussion, 
but there are certain key elements which do apply.  A sovereign nation-state has the right 
to maintain secure borders.  This includes the legal right to permit or not permit any or all 
people, goods, or communications from crossing the borders.  A state may choose not to 
fully exercise this recognized right, or a state may not have the means to enforce 
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complete compliance.  It may also choose to pass laws restricting the application of this 
principle for the benefit of its citizens, or enter into international agreements that also 
limit the application of this right.  However, exercised or not, the principle remains, and 
the right of a state to exercise control of its borders is strongly recognized.  The 
governments of countries usually in fact typically exercise this right in many ways short 
of the maximum extent.  No person, good, or traffic inherently has the right to cross the 
border of a sovereign country without permission, according to this principle, but 
governments choose to limit the application based on their own laws and international 
agreements.  In the United States, there are numerous ways the government has chosen 
not to apply the right, and some important ways the government exercises the right.  If a 
national government like the US government decides to allow at least some goods, 
people, and traffic to cross the border, and still maintain the right to deny entry of others, 
then logically it must inspect the people or goods to determine what will be allowed to 
pass.   
2. Physical Border Inspection 
The two most visible ways the US government performs this are through the 
inspection of goods, which is delegated to the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
agency, formerly the US Customs Service, and the inspection of people, which is 
delegated to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service (BCIS), formerly known 
as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  A huge volume of goods crosses 
the US borders, and even though Customs has a right to inspect all of it directly, they let 
the vast majority enter or leave with only a cursory inspection of accompanying 
documents or another expediting procedure.  These documents could include a customs 
declaration or a bill of lading by the party responsible for the goods indicating that no 
illegal goods are crossing the border, or similar information input into the Customs 
computer system.  Of course a system that does not inspect all goods crossing the border 
will encourage some, who are not concerned about breaking laws, to attempt to bring 
across illegal goods.  To deter this behavior and actually attempt to keep out a maximum 
amount of illegal goods, Customs uses a screening process that looks for suspicious 
activity that may be an indicator of attempted smuggling, and they use their inspection 
authority to examine in greater detail those goods that arouse reasonable suspicion.  The 
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US Customs describes this authority as “broad authority to conduct searches of persons 
and their baggage, cargo, and means of transportation entering the United States.  The 
courts have also held that this search, seizure, and arrest authority is not dependent upon 
either probable cause or a search warrant as is required by police.”27  US Customs also 
inspects suspicious goods or shipments that have been identified by intelligence 
information to be possibly carrying illegal goods.  This model, of inspecting a small 
portion of the massive traffic in goods based on reasonable suspicion or intelligence 
information, shows two things relevant to building the case for Internet inspections.  
First, it shows a current example of real inspections at the borders.  Second, it shows 
elements of a model of how Internet border inspections might work.  Internet inspections 
would also have to deal with very large volumes of traffic, and would need to minimize 
inspections to only traffic that is suspicious or had been identified by intelligence 
information as warranting inspection.  This implementation of this idea will be expanded 
upon in the discussion of technical feasibility. 
It is important to understand some key points related to US Customs authority.  
The laws that describe Customs authority are not the original source of the right to 
inspect.  The original right to control the borders is inherent to the US Government as a 
sovereign country.  Congress has been delegated under the US Constitution the right to 
pass laws related to control of the borders.  Congress has further delegated a portion of 
that authority to be executed by Customs and Border Protection agents under the 
executive branch of government.  As long as there is no limitation set by the US 
Constitution on what can be inspected, Congress has the authority to pass laws regarding 
inspections and other controls at the border, including potentially Internet border 
inspections   
In close parallel with the authority granted to Customs, the Bureau of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services has been delegated the authority to inspect persons seeking 
entry into the United States.  “An inspector has authority to search without warrant the 
person and effects of any person seeking admission, when there is reason to believe that 
grounds of exclusion exist which would be disclosed by such search.”28  The authority of 
                                                 
27 US Customs Inspections - Right to Search.  http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/.  May 10, 2003 
28 Immigration Inspection Program authority.  http://www.immigration.gov/. May 10, 2003. 
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CBP and BCIS is part of the Constitutionally vetted authority to perform inspections and 
searches that would normally not be allowed without a warrant if they were conducted 
within the territory of the US, but this extraordinary authority is allowed at the borders.  
The border is a special legal zone for inspections. 
3. Extending Inspection to Cyberspace 
We have at this point described the extraordinary authority to inspect and search 
people and goods in the physical realm at the borders.  Next we will examine how this 
could be extended to cyberspace.  The US legal system is derived from the British 
Common Law tradition.  This means that legal decisions are derived primarily from 
interpretation of written law, but additionally the precedents set in one case can be 
considered and held as legally applicable in the judicial decisions of subsequent cases.  
US Supreme Court cases are the most familiar form of this to most Americans who are 
not legal scholars.  A well-known non-cyber related example is when the Supreme Court 
heard the case of Roe vs. Wade29 and described certain legal principles in the majority 
ruling.  This particular case is used only as an example of well-known case law, not for 
any principles applied to cyberspace.  All other courts throughout the US must consider 
the principles from Roe when they are relevant before they can make a final ruling.  Even 
new cases, where new reproductive technologies have direct bearing on the case, can 
look within the whole body of previous rulings to find legal principles that might be 
appropriately applied, even though the current laws on the books did not anticipate the 
new technologies.  The point here is legal principles and current laws are considered 
together to make legal decisions, and legal principles derived from one case can be 
extended to other situations.   
From the common law legal tradition cases involving the proper method of 
obtaining search warrants for evidence contained on computers could be adjudicated even 
though new laws had not yet been passed that particularly detailed how Congress wanted 
search warrants to be handled relating to computers.  The US Department of Justice 
(DOJ), Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) published a guide for 
law enforcement officials which gives examples of legal principles drawn from cases and 
applies them to computer crimes, even though some of them were decided outside the 
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realm of computers.30  One case that exemplifies this shows how legal precedents in the 
physical world provide legal principles for cyberspace, and thus legally valid guidance.  
In the case O’Connor v. Ortega,31 the courts ruled on the legality of a search of the 
government office and desk of a government employee, Magno Ortega.  No computer 
was involved, but the principles were established describing when the government can 
search without a warrant an office assigned to one of their employees.  The US Ninth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals upheld a lower court decision that found that the warrantless 
search of the government office assigned to Ortega was illegal in part because he had a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in that office.  This case has been extended to apply 
to government computer hard drives and network storage devices, and is used to guide 
legal officials and investigators in deciding when they might need a warrant to search 
such devices.  The point here is that legal principles were derived from a case in the 
physical world and they have been applied to the computer world.  This can be extended 
to argue that the legal principles that already allow physical inspections at the border 
might also apply to the Internet.  The border is a zone of special legal jurisdiction based 
on national sovereignty.  Physical inspections have been established and it is reasonable 
to explore the idea that the same principles might apply allowing inspection of Internet 
traffic at the border as well.  New laws would have to be written specifically authorizing 
such inspections, but the primary guiding legal principles may already be established. 
4. Information Goods Crossing the Border 
The argument given so far could start to build a case for Internet border inspection 
if one or both of two conditions exist.  First, if the traffic on the Internet is similar enough 
to people and goods which currently cross the border; and second, if inspection properly 
extends beyond people and goods to also fit the traffic on the Internet.  The first condition 
will be examined by answering the question: Is the traffic on the Internet similar enough 
to people and goods which currently cross the border?  First we will examine goods.  
Many people primarily think of the Internet as a communications medium.  There is at 
least one fundamental difference between the Internet and other electronic 
                                                 
29 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
30 US Dept of Justice. Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal 
Investigations. http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm.  July 2002 
31 O’Connor v. Ortega. 480 US 709 (1987). 
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communications media: on the Internet you can actually buy, sell, ship, and receive 
information goods like software and digital music, and this is now commonplace.  Over 
the telephone you can make arrangements to purchase goods but it would not be 
considered common to receive the goods themselves over the phone.  The value of goods 
moving over the Internet has also continued to grow.  Goods crossing the border may not 
be a large part of the Internet traffic but there is no question that goods with real value are 
crossing the border via the Internet, and they are crossing without any of the normal 
inspection procedures that would accompany the same material transported in the form of 
physical goods such as CDs or DVDs.  Another specific good that can cross the border in 
either physical form or electronic form is child pornography, and it is contraband in both 
cases.  If routine physical inspections identified child pornography crossing the border 
the goods would be seized.  On the Internet there is no such inspection regime.  The point 
here is not to propose that Internet inspection be established to routinely inspect content 
for child pornography.  Physical border inspections and proposed Internet border 
inspections do not need to examine content unless there is a reasonable cause to do so.  
Instead the point to be made here is that the Internet is a place where goods with real 
value cross borders, and these need not inherently be considered outside the normal 
purview of border control.  Secondly, if contraband were identified trying to cross the 
border, it is reasonable that a sovereign government should be allowed to block its 
crossing the border on the Internet.  The technical details of the second point are of 
course important, and these will be discussed in detail in the chapter on technical 
feasibility.  The principle being established at this point is that real goods cross the border 
on the Internet and a sovereign state reasonably has an interest in those goods. 
There may be a fairly clear argument that goods of real value and contraband 
cross the border on the Internet, but it would not be apparent at first that people cross the 
border.  In order to explain this idea, legal principles must be derived from physical space 
that would also apply to cyberspace.  In this case we must consider some of the principles 
of why people are inspected at the border.  People attempting to cross the border are 
either citizens or non-citizens.  Citizens are allowed to enter but their person or property 
may be inspected if there is a reasonable suspicion that they may be attempting to carry 
contraband into the country.  Non-citizens are allowed to enter if they meet a more 
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rigorous set of requirements intended to keep out undesirable persons.32  There are nine 
broad categories of grounds for denying entry into the country: criminal activity, national 
security, health, lack of labor certification, likelihood of becoming a public charge, 
previous immigration violations, lack of proper documents, permanent ineligibility for 
citizenship, draft evasion and some other uncommon situations.33  The description of the 
categories is useful in two respects.  First it shows that the categories for exclusion are 
reasonable and not simply arbitrary, and second it includes two categories that can be 
highlighted. Individuals can be disallowed entry into the United States for criminal 
related reasons and national security related reasons.   
5. People Crossing the Border via the Internet 
Since a person does not physically travel through the Internet, it must be 
demonstrated that a person can function in cyberspace in a way that is at least analogous 
to travel through physical space.  On the Internet an individual can connect from a 
computer at their location and then establish an interactive session to a computer in 
another physical location.  This is normal with many Internet services, but with some, the 
individual can have user level or complete administrative level control over the remote 
computer system.  This is also one difference that separates the Internet from normal 
telephone communication.  This control can be authorized, which poses no threat, or it 
can be unauthorized, often gained using hacker tools.  This unauthorized activity crosses 
the threshold into criminal activity and can even move into the realm of posing a threat to 
national security.  If the hacker is in one country and he uses tools to gain unauthorized 
access into a computer in another country, he has effectively crossed the border and he 
now has almost total control of a computer located in another country with almost all of 
the same power as if he were physically sitting at the keyboard.  With this control he can 
steal or corrupt information, or even destroy all of the information on a computer.  If the 
computer system is used to control a physical process, for example, power distribution, 
the hacker can also incur damages in the physical world.  His ability to cross the border is 
limited on the Internet, but it is still potentially significant.  The normal border 
inspections, which could deny him legal physical entry, to prevent criminal activity or 
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threats to national security, are not applied to keep him out on the Internet.  He could be a 
known hacker, indicted for criminal activity or national security violations, which would 
prevent his legal entry into the United States. He could even be coming from a known 
Internet address.  But there is currently no way to track or stop him from crossing the 
border on the Internet and stealing computer information or engaging in other malicious 
activity inside computers located on US soil.  In a limited but real sense people are 
routinely crossing the border into the US and committing crimes on US soil with no 
means to inspect or stop them.  The idea of people crossing the border on the Internet 
should not be over extended, but it is appropriate to consider it a border crossing within 
the narrow confines of the environment where it occurs, the Internet.  If a known hacker 
outside the United States had exclusive use of the same Internet address for a hacking 
spree into the US, it would seem prudent to allow increased inspection of Internet traffic 
from that IP address.  It is reasonable that a sovereign state should have an interest and 
potentially be able to block hostile criminal or national security related activity from 
crossing the border, if there is a feasible way to achieve this without undue constraints to 
non-suspicious traffic.  Again the technical details are important and are described later. 
It is useful to make an interim summary of the analysis so far before extending the 
argument further.  Up to this point the case has been laid out that national sovereignty 
gives a state the right to strongly protect national borders, and this includes expansive 
authority for inspection at the borders.  The US has delegated a portion of this authority 
to US Customs and BCIS, granting them the responsibility to inspect goods and people 
crossing the border.  The US legal system uses common law tradition, which can derive 
legal principles from one case and apply them to another situation.  Thus the idea of 
potentially extending border inspections to cyberspace can be considered reasonable.  
Further, such inspections might apply to information goods crossing the border as well as 
a limited notion of people crossing the border.  However, one of the strongest counter 
arguments to all of this is that the Internet is still primarily a communications medium 
and thus a special case, which should be exempt from inspection.  The case for Internet 
inspection will need to be extended to adequately address this counter argument. 
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6. Other Communications Media 
There are two communications media, which between them parallel almost all of 
the important elements of the Internet.  These are the telephone and regular mail.  Mail 
will be examined first.  Mail is a communications medium that has many similarities to 
the Internet.  Both can be used for everything from very private communication to very 
expensive commerce.  Mail is sent by identifiable packages, typically with outer 
wrappers that may not disclose explicitly the contents, and which have specific and 
unique addresses identifying to whom and from whom the package is sent.  The Internet 
uses information packets also, with information headers that do not explicitly disclose the 
contents, and these also have specific and unique to and from Internet addresses.  Mail 
also travels across borders in vast quantities that would make detailed inspection of more 
than a small percentage impractical and undesirable.  The same might be assumed about 
Internet packets.  A characteristic of mail that may be less generally well understood is 
the fact that mail crossing the borders is subject to increased inspection authority as well.  
Within US borders the US Postal Service Inspectors maintain the authority to inspect 
specific packages, but it would require a legal due process procedure based typically 
upon probable cause to be able to examine the contents of a package.  However current 
US law extends the authority of US Customs to inspect mail along with other goods 
crossing the border into the country.34  There have even been recent changes to US 
Customs law that grant this authority, and Customs now has the authority to inspect 
outbound mail that appears to be sent for commercial purposes if there is a reasonable 
suspicion that it may contain contraband.  This authority to inspect inbound mail crossing 
the border without a warrant based on a “reasonable suspicion” is part of current laws and 
regulations and has been held to be constitutional in Ramsey v. U.S.35  We can derive 
from this the idea that if communication on the Internet is like mail, then it would be 
logical that inbound traffic could be inspected. 
What then about the comparison of the nature of the Internet with the telephone?  
The telephone and the Internet also have many parallels between them.  Both are 
electronic communications media.  Internet connections often send digital signals or 
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35 Ramsey v. U.S., 431 U.S. 606 (1977).   
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modulated analog signals of digital information over telephone lines, and the Internet is 
used to send voice signals just like telephone conversations, so there is in fact a 
significant real overlap.  Telephone conversations strongly resemble the interactive 
sessions established on the Internet.  The similarities and overlaps are so strong that most 
laws and legal opinions addressing interception of Internet traffic closely parallel 
telephone wiretap laws.  In this case, wiretap laws have many characteristics more like 
surveillance of an individual than border inspection, but it is easy to consider the 
telephone and Internet similar media.   
If the telephone is the best parallel in many ways then certain details must be 
considered describing how the two media are the same, and how they are different.  
Telephone conversations are not inspected at the border.  Should we thus conclude there 
should not be Internet inspections?  This is too great a logical leap also.  It has already 
been established that the Internet is a place where it is common for goods both legitimate 
and contraband to directly transit across borders, and goods themselves do not directly 
cross the border via the telephone.  Also, we should consider the possible reasons 
telephone conversations are not inspected at the borders.  National sovereignty is asserted 
at the borders for two primary reasons, to collect tariffs and duties, and for security.  With 
regard to tariffs, there is no need to monitor the content of telephone conversations to 
gather the fees set by the government, as there are other telephone billing structures 
which allow a country to collect taxes on international telephone calls.  So we can see 
that telephone conversations do not need to be inspected at the border for tariffs and 
duties.  But we also see that the telephone is not so special that it is exempt from all 
assertion of national sovereignty, because taxes are collected.   
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With regard to the issue of national sovereignty being expressed to protect 
national security, the border for technical reasons is not a convenient place to monitor 
content.  If the government has sufficient probable cause for monitoring the content of a 
telephone conversation crossing the border to intercept a conversation, for example, 
between an international drug trafficker and his US operative, then this is most 
conveniently done through the wiretap procedures already established, which would 
monitor the telephone at a local telephone company not at the border.  It can be surmised 
that no procedure for inspecting telephone conversations has been established at the 
border per se for convenience rather than necessarily some special property of the 
medium.  Another difference between the Internet and the telephone is that while the 
telephone may be used to commit a crime, like telemarketing fraud, this type of crime 
involves someone on the receiving end of the conversation that is aware of the activity 
and in the position to make a choice even if they are unaware of the criminal intent of the 
perpetrator of the crime.  However on the Internet there is now a large and growing threat 
of hostile probes and subsequent criminal hacking activity being perpetrated daily and the 
vast majority of such crime occurs with little or no awareness of the crime until it is 
complete.  There are some fundamental differences between the majority of telephone 
crimes and Internet crimes.  The nature of the threat reasonably should be taken into 
consideration.   
When the threat is taken into consideration even the content of telephone 
communications can be a target of Communications Intelligence (COMINT).  In the 
wake of September 11th there has been an increased public awareness of the ability of the 
National Security Agency (NSA) to target and intercept potential terrorist cellular phone 
conversations.  Senator Orrin Hatch was just one highly visible example of a government 
official acknowledging such a capability, even though he was then criticized for the 
public nature of his acknowledgement.  No matter what the source, this capability has 
more or less officially been acknowledged for a number of years.  George Washington 
University maintains an archive of declassified and sanitized NSA documents obtained 
through the Freedom of Information Act.  These documents provide an important 
understanding of some of the ways that COMINT, which would include telephone 
communication, is monitored and some of the important restrictions against monitoring 
“US Persons”36 in the course of NSA COMINT collections.37  This type of collection 
demonstrates the fact that telephone communications outside the US borders is in fact not 
a medium that is so special that it cannot be monitored.  These collections are not 
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conducted under the authority of US Customs, which operates under Title 19 of the US 
Code, but they are legally conducted under national security and intelligence authorities 
and restrictions, which are granted under Title 50 USC.  The purpose of monitoring is to 
protect the US from national security threats primarily outside our borders.  NSA is 
strongly restricted against collecting intelligence on US Persons unless they are terrorists 
or agents of a foreign power.  This difference in legal authority between Title 19 and 
Title 50 is not trivial but it does not obviate the point that telephone conversations are not 
so special that a sovereign nation like the United States cannot gather some information 
under specific circumstances to include national security.  Even if Internet border 
inspections were implemented through other means and under different agency 
authorities, such inspection could be used to counter national security and criminal 
threats.  It is reasonable for a sovereign nation to consider the content of certain national 
security related electronic communications outside its borders. 
One other important difference between the telephone system and the Internet, 
which has been indicated so far but not explicitly stated, is the Internet is a much more 
complex environment than the telephone system.  A clear and explicit recognition of this 
complexity leads to an understanding that any one previous communications medium 
does not fully establish all of the appropriate precedents for handling the Internet.  The 
Internet is not a monolith, and it is overly simplistic to treat it only like the telephone.  A 
more sophisticated approach is necessary in formulating laws and structures to properly 
handle the complex issues of the Internet.  There are some aspects of the Internet which 
are virtually identical to telephone communication like Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VOIP).  There are other ways that it is very much like mail, with email being a clear 
example, or IP packets at a different level of detail.  Also, it is in some ways like physical 
goods crossing borders, and in other ways it is like people crossing the border.  In fact 
there is a specific internationally recognized process for identifying specific Internet 
communication protocols and establishing technical standards for handling them, to 
include VOIP, email, and a host of many others.  “The Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) is the central coordinator for the assignment of unique parameter 
values for Internet protocols. The IANA is chartered by the Internet Society (ISOC) and 
the Federal Network Council (FNC) to act as the clearinghouse to assign and coordinate 
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the use of numerous Internet protocols.”38  The Internet has potentially up to 65535 
unique ports that can be used to pass IP information, and hundreds if not thousands of 
these ports have already been registered to use specific services.  For example email 
typically is sent over port 25, and web traffic is sent over port 80 as a standard.  The point 
should not be overblown here to assert that there are thousands of unique ways from a 
legal perspective to handle the Internet, but it does seem reasonable to assert that it is a 
more complex medium than any one previous communications medium like the 
telephone or mail, if each one is taken on their own.  The complexity of the Internet is 
thus deserving of a more sophisticated treatment.  It seems reasonable that appropriate 
principles and precedents from previous communications and transportation media 
should be applied to appropriate communications within the complex structure of the 
Internet.   
7. Precedents from the Internet 
A final consideration will be discussed in building the logical case for Internet 
border inspection.  Previously we have considered the legal principle of national 
sovereignty and physical border inspections and extended this to the Internet.  Then we 
considered the similarities and differences between the Internet and other 
communications media.  However, there are already many significant principles and 
precedents in place for handling traffic on the Internet.  One law that gives a more 
detailed description of how the Internet is handled is the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA).  This law specifies, among other things, the various legal authorities 
and limitations regarding monitoring of traffic on the Internet.  It describes authorities 
and limitations not only for law enforcement, but also for Internet service providers.  In 
addition any organization that provides Internet services like email or web access within 
the organization has been granted the authority to monitor incoming traffic, which can 
include content, if the monitoring can be reasonably shown to be part of maintaining 
security on their network.  This includes the authority to set up computers that can 
examine communication coming in and out of their networks at the “border” of their 
Internet structure, called “Firewalls”.  These firewalls are routinely set up as part of a 
multi-layer security structure designed to protect the network from hostile network 
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attacks or other malicious activity.  Other computers are sometimes set up as intrusion 
detection systems, and these also are authorized to automatically monitor traffic including 
content, for the express and narrow purpose of protecting the network.  These authorities 
are already granted to legal entities such as organizations that provide Internet access to 
users inside the organization.  In fact building up this type of security infrastructure is a 
very large part of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.39  The point here is not to 
confuse the issues of authority between the government’s authority to monitor and the 
private entities authority to monitor.  Instead the point is that there is already an 
established principle recognizing the legitimate interest in monitoring Internet traffic at 
the “border” of a legal entity.  If security is a legitimate interest and held to be valid for 
entities within a sovereign state, then it certainly seems reasonable to assume that the 
sovereign itself would have a similar right if it were established within an appropriately 
narrow framework. 
Previously we have pointed out that different government agencies operate under 
different legal authorities (e.g. Customs operates under Title 19 USC, and NSA operates 
under Title 50 USC).  This may initially be considered inappropriate mixing of legal 
authority at the border when considering inspection in cyberspace.  In fact these different 
authorities are complementary when considering how different agencies use them to 
provide protection at the border in physical space.  They could be considered 
complimentary in cyberspace as well.  The case has been built so far primarily on the 
logical extension of Customs type authorities from physical space into cyberspace.  
However if there were a technical means for monitoring traffic at the border, different 
agencies, each with their different authorities and restrictions, could operate to protect the 
legitimate interests of the United States and it citizens each within their own sphere of 
interest.  For example, US Customs could inspect traffic for goods and contraband 
crossing the border under a modified Title 19 authority that specifically granted them the 
Internet inspection authority.  Law enforcement could operate at the border against 
hackers crossing the border to commit crimes, under a modified Title 18 USC authority, 
and they would do so under the limits of needing a judicially approved warrant to 
conduct such criminal investigations.  Intelligence agencies could operate at the border, 
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under their Title 50 USC authorities and restrictions, to gather information about 
terrorists and agents of a foreign power operating in the United States.  And the 
Department of Defense could operate at the border, under their Title 10 authorities and 
restrictions, to protect the United States against Information Warfare attacks during a 
time of war or hostilities.  The technical methods of conducting such operations will be 
discussed in Chapter IV.  
An argument has been built here that takes the current practices of physical border 
inspection and describes a reasonable extension into cyberspace.  This has been 
compared to other communications media to parse out significant similarities and 
differences, thus establishing a reasonable consideration for Internet border inspection.  
Finally the current established practices and principles of Internet traffic have been 
considered, which might reasonably be considered to extend to the sovereign state at the 
borders.  This builds the case that it is reasonable to consider Internet border inspections, 
but the case is not complete until it is understood what the sovereign state would do if it 
asserted such authority.  The last part of this chapter will consider this issue. 
 
B. THE USES OF INTERNET BORDER INSPECTION 
The idea of Internet border inspection is one that immediately triggers a cautious 
response in people who have a respect for values of freedom and privacy.  This is natural 
because without much thought the idea of expanded opportunities for government 
surveillance brings with it ideas of how individual Internet activities like web surfing and 
email could be monitored without the individual being aware of it.  The idea of some 
faceless government bureaucrat reading innocent but private emails sent to friends or 
family outside the borders is offensive.  While people may be visiting web sites of 
personal interest that may be entirely legitimate and wholesome, few people would want 
the government to have a record of individual web activity.  These are just a couple of a 
broader host of entirely legitimate concerns.  The case for Internet border inspection must 
consider concerns like these.  A structure that does not properly address these concerns 
should be considered illegitimate and should not be implemented.  However, these issues 
are not completely new, and there are principles and structures that have already been 
39
established as legitimate, which can guide the development of the conceptual structure of 
establishing Internet border inspection.  Certain details of a more technical nature are 
addressed in a later chapter but the general purposes are addressed in this section.   
It has been previously discussed that border inspection is currently conducted for 
several reasons, of which three primary reasons will be addressed here.  Borders 
inspections are used to protect national security, to prevent criminal activity, and to 
collect appropriate taxes on goods.  The last one is a good example of how the logic may 
be sufficient, but if there is not a practical means to implement Internet border inspection 
for tax collection, then inspection for this specific purpose should not be implemented.  
There is more than one problem with Internet border inspection for taxes.  One is that the 
government has up to now been interested in fostering commerce on the Internet in part 
by specifically allowing most goods not to be taxed.  Additionally the way this proposal 
envisions inspections is specifically narrow and may not easily address all the appropriate 
Customs duties concerns.  However there may be a way to separate certain traffic that is 
primarily goods based upon the registered and standard Internet service that carries it.  
For example peer-to-peer software is typically used to share information goods, such as 
music and software, across the Internet.  The standard port for sharing these files is IP 
port 1214.  Customs could potentially monitor this port from certain suspicious IP 
addresses to exercise their inspection authority.  They may not be able to collect Customs 
tariffs and duties but they might be able to identify contraband or other illegal goods 
crossing the border in significant enough quantities to take other legal actions against the 
criminals trafficking in such goods. 
1. Inspection of Incoming Goods 
The other two issues related to border inspection are protection of national 
security and prevention of crime.  Proper handling of these two issues is among the most 
important duties of a sovereign state.  As was discussed previously, US Customs already 
deals with the issue of inspecting the enormous volume of traffic in goods and mail 
crossing the border.  They choose to allow the vast majority of it to pass without any 
detailed physical inspection of the goods.  The criteria they use to determine the small 
proportion of goods they will inspect in greater detail is based on “reasonable suspicion,” 
sometimes specifically bolstered by intelligence information.  Neither the shipper nor 
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Customs may know before a shipment of goods is processed through Customs if it will be 
inspected in detail.  If the accompanying documents or other required Customs forms 
have some information that is reasonably suspicious, then Customs officials can inspect 
the shipment.  Also if US Customs receives specific criminal intelligence information 
that indicates a certain shipment may contain contraband like illegal drugs, then they are 
very likely to pick that shipment for inspection out of the vast number of shipments 
crossing the border daily.  With this example in mind, it seems reasonable to propose an 
Internet border inspection structure that would let the vast majority of Internet traffic pass 
without any inspection and no record kept of its crossing the border.  However, if there 
was some specific national security or criminal intelligence information that indicated 
that a certain Internet IP address outside the US borders was trafficking in information of 
a contraband nature or engaging in criminal activity within the US, then inspection seems 
very reasonable.  Because IP addresses are a cornerstone feature of the Internet 
architecture, IP addresses could be used as part of a method of implementing inspections.  
The specifics of implementation are discussed in the next chapter, but at this point it may 
suffice to state that there are reasonable grounds to assume that IP-based inspections may 
be technically feasible.  It must be emphasized that normal traffic would not be inspected 
at all and no record would be kept of normal traffic crossing the border. 
 
2. Inspection to Prevent Terrorism 
Examples of how this might work may be useful to describe.  In the overview, the 
example was given of imagining that there is a known IP address outside the US used by 
controlling elements of Osama bin-Ladin’s Al-Q’aida terrorist organization.  Other 
individual criminal or national security threats could be easily imagined with known IP 
addresses identified through intelligence.  These could include a variety of threats from 
drug traffickers, to hackers on a hacking spree, to spies using computers to gain access to 
sensitive information.  Once the suspicious IP address is identified, it could be provided 
to those charged with operating the Internet border inspection, who in turn could load it 
into the appropriate Internet routers at the border.  The routers would then divert that 
traffic into a system for more detailed inspection.  Internet border inspection would thus 
be specific and based only on validated intelligence information passed through an 
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appropriate due process.  Only content from the suspicious IP addresses would be 
examined.  All other traffic would pass by unexamined and uninspected.  Such 
inspections would be reasonable, and would appropriately respect the freedom and 
privacy issues that immediately concern many people.   
3. Inspecting to Keep Out Contraband 
In addition to the inspection purpose just described, Internet border inspection 
could be used to keep out contraband.  Again we can imagine an IP address that might be 
a web site containing child pornography.  Since there is a legitimate government interest 
in preventing such contraband from entering the country, the appropriate border routers 
could be set up to disallow all traffic coming from that IP address.  Alternatively, the 
traffic could be shunted to another server for a more detailed inspection.  In a similar 
fashion, an IP address that was identified as being the source of known hostile hacker 
activity could likewise be blocked or monitored and appropriate information passed to 
law enforcement officials.  Doing so might aid in investigating and prosecuting the 
individual responsible for the hacking activity.   
4. Inspection to Prevent Crime 
There is daily hostile hacker-related probing and intrusion activity from outside 
the US coming across the borders.  A normal part of Internet Service Provider customer 
agreements in the United States includes the acknowledgement by the customer that 
hostile activity, such as probes and intrusions, is against the acceptable use policy and is 
grounds for terminating the customer’s account.  We can see then a logic that indicates 
that there are reasonable grounds for disallowing even probes that do not meet the level 
of criminal activity.  We can imagine then that if a foreign IP address were being 
routinely used for probing and intrusion attempts, even if it did not reach the level of 
criminal activity, may still be considered among the traffic to be monitored or blocked.  If 
this were implemented, then specific IP addresses might be blocked initially for some 
reasonable short period like 15 days.  If the IP address were identified again as continuing 
the activity a longer period might be considered like 30 days or longer.  If the owner of 
the IP address became interested in reversing the block, a procedure could be established 
to request the block to be removed.  Reasonable grounds need to be established for 
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blocking and proper oversight should be maintained, but hostile probes and other hacking 
activity should be among the activities considered as potentially legitimate for blocking. 
5. Information Blocks and Embargoes 
Studies in international relations describe a sovereign state as a primary actor in 
the international arena.  States are considered to be able to legitimately use certain 
instruments of national power to protect their national interest, as long as that does not 
unduly infringe upon the rights of other states.  National power is parsed in different 
ways but one way describes the instruments of national power as being military, 
economic, diplomatic, and information.40  Typically information power has been seen as 
including the US using intelligence information to support allies and interests even when 
it may not want to use more direct means to influence the outcome of an international 
situation.  Economic power includes among other things the ability to impose economic 
sanctions on another county to achieve a desired outcome.  If there were a method 
already in place to allow IP addresses to be blocked at the border, then there would be a 
new method of using information as an instrument of national power.  Another 
international actor that is not cooperating with the United States could be subject to an 
information embargo if appropriate Presidential and Congressional action were taken to 
authorize it.  For example, criminal investigators in the United States have in the past 
investigated computer hacker activity and traced the activity back to a likely subject in 
another country.  If the foreign country does not have laws against the crime, then the US 
government is usually stymied in taking further action to investigate or prosecute the 
individual.  The US has worked in international forums like the Council of Europe and 
bilaterally to encourage other countries to update their laws.  However, some countries 
may not assign Internet-based crime the same priority as the US.  These countries may do 
so in part because the hackers may avoid targeting their own country and prefer instead to 
focus their hacking efforts on the target rich environment in the US.  It would typically be 
seen as an inappropriate response to use economic or military instruments of power to 
encourage unresponsive foreign countries to give a higher priority to updating their laws 
against hacker activity.  It might be much more appropriate to use exactly the same 
instrument of power, access to US-based information on the Internet, as the potential 
                                                 
40 Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 Feb 1995 
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incentive to update their laws.  If they do not respond then they could face an information 
embargo.  All IP address ranges from the unresponsive country could be blocked or 
subject to increased inspection.  Because the US is a dominant power on the Internet, this 
could be a substantial incentive.  Unresponsive countries could easily see updating their 
laws and prosecuting computer crimes as much more in their national interest, if even the 
threat of sanctions could be applied.  This is not currently a viable method of exerting 
national power, but a robust Internet border inspection regime could make it viable.   
 
C. CONCLUSION 
The case has been made that there is a reasonable basis for considering Internet 
border inspections.  The purpose and use of Internet inspection was pointed out to be a 
critical part of a sufficient rationale for inspections.  An Internet address IP-based 
description has been described and shown how it would work to support criminal 
investigations and national security.  The appropriate use of this could clearly and 
reasonably support US national interests.  Such a system of IP-based inspections would 
also not unduly inhibit other legitimate Internet activity crossing the border.  With proper 
administration and oversight this could be a significant net benefit to US security and 
national interests.  Even if all of the applications discussed were not implemented, there 
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IV. TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY 
Careful technical implementation of Internet border controls is key to their being 
both feasible and legal.  This chapter will address the key technical question of 
feasibility, but as this thesis is not primarily a technical thesis, it will not address detailed 
technical issues.  There are many who are unfamiliar with the backbone structure of the 
Internet who would be first inclined to believe that border inspections are not even 
possible.  There are others with technical knowledge who believe that such inspections 
might be possible in some areas, but they can easily imagine a host of ways to get around 
an inspection regime.  Both of these issues and others will be addressed in this chapter.  
Also this chapter will provide a high level technical discussion of the use of routers as a 
feasible method for conducting inspections based primarily on Internet IP addresses. 
A. INTERNET BACKBONES AND TRANS-OCEANIC CABLES 
To explore the feasibility of Internet border inspection, one of the key facts to 
know about the Internet is that the vast majority of non-local traffic typically travels 
along major Internet backbones, both within a large country like the United States and 
internationally (see Figure 1).  These backbones function much like the interstate 
highway system handles automobile traffic.  The average user connects to an Internet 
Service Provider through a dial-up, Digital Subscriber Link (DSL), or cable connection, 
which is like driving out of their driveway and onto local neighborhood streets.  The ISPs 
either have their own major Internet backbone connections, or they connect to major 
providers that do.  This is like people driving from their neighborhood streets to major 
city streets, and then to the major highways.  To extend this street metaphor, though, you 
would have to imagine major highways crossing the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean to 
connect to the other continents.  The Internet connects the major domestic backbones at 
geographic hubs, and then these send and receive the information across dozens of 
undersea cables from the border of the United States to Europe, Asia, the Caribbean, 
South America, and Africa.     
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Figure 1.   North American Terrestrial Network Capacity - Major Routes 
 
Notes: Map depicts network providers who offered private line connectivity to three or more states at 155 Mbps (or higher) as part of 
their standard offerings. The map is designed to illustrate intercity connectivity and does not necessarily reflect the exact physical 
routing of fiber.   Source: From TeleGeography’s Terrestrial Bandwidth 2002 © TeleGeography, Inc. 2002 Used with Permission of 
Telegeography.   www.telegeograpy.com 
 
When considering the trans-oceanic cables that cross into the United States it is 
useful to consider separately those cables that cross into the continental US on the 
Atlantic coast from those that cross into the continental US on the Pacific coast.  On the 
Atlantic coast there are approximately 28 trans-Atlantic and trans-Caribbean cables 
carrying both Internet and telephone traffic that come into the continental United States 
(see Figure 2).  These cables cross into the continental United States on the Atlantic coast 
in 10 locations, but they are largely concentrated into 8 of these locations along the east 
coast of the United States.  These are most concentrated at the New York / New Jersey 
stations, where 14 of the 28 cables connect representing significantly more than half the 
bandwidth and traffic entering the continental US on the Atlantic coast.41  
 
 
                                                 
41 TeleGeography, Global Internet Geography 2003, International Internet Statistics and Commentary. 2003, 
TeleGeography: Washington, DC. p. 250. 
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Figure 2.   Major Submarine Cable Systems in N. America (Atlantic & Caribbean) 










Internal to US Territory
External to US Territory





On the Pacific coast, 12 trans-Pacific cables cross into the United States and 
connect to 8 locations (see Figure 3).  There are other Internet backbone connections that 
first cross the border into US territory at Hawaii and Guam.  This mildly complicates 
matters but is really not very different than physical goods crossing the borders, which 
also may cross US borders first into a US territory rather than the continental US.  When 
considering the US and its territories, in both the Pacific and Atlantic, there are less than 
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30 locations in the US and its territories that carry all of the Internet traffic crossing the 
border into the US via submarine cable.  These are fairly concentrated as well with 7 of 
the 12 crossing the Pacific connecting in three locations in the continental US, and 20 of 
28 cables arriving in three continental US locations in the Atlantic.  This represents a 
very large concentration of Internet connectivity crossing US borders.42   
 























Source: TeleGeography research, Submarine Bandwidth 2002
Internal to US Territory
External to US Territory
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42 TeleGeography, Global Internet Geography 2003, International Internet Statistics and Commentary. 
2003, TeleGeography: Washington, DC. p. 249. 
In addition to the trans-oceanic cables, significant trans-border connections enter 
the US from Canada and Mexico.  Again there is a reasonably high concentration of the 
traffic via a backbone network.  There are four Canadian cities that connect to three US 
cites and these connections represent 79% of the total Canadian international bandwidth.  
It is a similar situation with Internet connections to Mexico.  There are primarily four 
backbone connections that represent the bulk of the Internet traffic connecting the US and 
Mexico.43 
There are of course many other international Internet connections besides the 
submarine cables.  These include international corporations with dedicated leased 
telephone lines, satellite data links, and long distance modem connections from foreign 
countries.  These alternate links, however, represent a small fraction of the total Internet 
traffic crossing the borders in and out of the US (see Figure 4).  Implementation of 
Internet border inspections cannot be considered invalid because it is not a 100% 
solution.  This can be compared again to border inspections in the physical world.  There 
is a small but significant percentage of the total number of people and goods crossing the 
border into the US who do so illegally, but this does not invalidate the current regime of 
inspecting people and goods crossing the US border.  Internet border inspection can start 
with a solution that covers the overwhelming majority of Internet traffic crossing the 
border via submarine cables first, and then later consider solutions for inspecting other 
methods of transmission at a later time.  The relatively small bandwidth of modem and 
satellite connections and relatively higher cost make both of them inefficient and 
expensive ways to cross the border without inspection, and they are unlikely to ever 
constitute large portion of Internet traffic. 
To summarize, close examination of the Internet backbone structure reveals a 
significant concentration of cross border traffic. Thus, the bulk of Internet traffic could be 
inspected with a reasonable number of inspection stations.  
                                                 
43 Ibid. p. 63, 25. 
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Figure 4.   Map of Major Interregional Internet Routes to North America, 2002 
 
Notes: Map includes interregional Internet routes with at least 1,500 Mbps of aggregate capacity. Figures represent Internet bandwidth
connected across international borders to each Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area or equivalent. Domestic routes are omitted. 
Source: TeleGeography research, Global Internet Geography 2003 Copyright TeleGeography, Inc. 2002   
B. TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INSPECTION 
The next question is: how would inspection take place?  The idea that inspection 
would be based primarily on Internet IP addresses was discussed previously.  There are 
two types of Internet devices that could be used for supporting Internet border inspection: 
firewalls and routers.  Firewalls are typically very sophisticated packages of computer 
hardware and software that perform a wide variety of network security functions.  Many 
organizations use them to protect their internal networks from hostile activity on the 
Internet at large.  Some firewalls examine all the incoming content for purposes that 
include protecting the network from computer intrusions and email viruses, and they can 
be configured to perform these functions in real time.  They can also be set up to block 
certain traffic and allow other traffic to pass unhindered.  The sophistication and 
complexity of these firewall products significantly enhances security, but the content 
analysis and other complex functions in firewall products impose a heavy performance 
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penalty.  Also, if they are not properly configured or are not robust enough to handle high 
volumes of Internet traffic, they can significantly slow down traffic passing through from 
outside to inside the firewall.  Establishing such a system on a national basis would be 
potentially expensive and complex both technologically and legally.  A firewall-based 
solution would border on being unfeasible for both technical and legal reasons.   
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A router-based solution is another alternative, and this is the one suggested here.  
A router examines packet header information such as IP addresses, but not message 
content.  A router processes a data packet like a mail sorter.  It looks at destination 
addresses and quickly passes the packet on to the next appropriate router until the packet 
reaches its destination.  Routers already exist all across the Internet passing traffic from 
place to place, and they are an integral part of the infrastructure.  Traffic coming across 
the trans-oceanic cables or other backbone structure at some point shortly after crossing 
the border must pass through a router to be directed to the next step in the best path along 
the Internet from origin to destination.  When any packet arrives at this router, it will be 
directed to another location based upon the relatively simple rules specifically listed in 
the routing table of each router.  The routing table compares the packet’s destination IP 
address to the rules and sends the packet on to the next router that the rules have 
identified as the best one along the path.  Routers can also route information based on the 
source IP address if this is set up in the routing table.  As long as there are not too many 
different rules in the routing table then the router performs this function quickly and 
efficiently.  Internet border inspection based on IP address could be established by setting 
up an appropriate router at a nexus to the border and adding a rule which would reroute a 
packet, with a predetermined source IP address, out of the main traffic stream and instead 
into a second government inspection station computer.  In the inspection station, the 
traffic could be inspected to determine if it should be allowed to pass, or if some other 
action should be taken based upon approved legal measures.  Routers could also block 
traffic from a specific IP address or even a range of addresses if the appropriate rule were 
set up in the routing table.  A key point to be made here is that the vast majority of traffic 
would pass through the router unimpeded and no content would be examined, nor would 
any record be kept of its passing.  Only the traffic from legally vetted suspicious IP 
addresses would be shunted aside and examined.  From the point of view of the router, 
the process would be just another rule, and unless there were too many new rules it would 
not impede other traffic at all.  No new technology would need to be invented because 
routers are already part of the foundation of the Internet structure, and routing tables are a 
standard method of routing traffic.  Internet border inspection stations based on routers 
would basically be almost identical to the existing traffic routers at the border, but they 
would have additional rules input from time to time to allow alternate routing of specified 
IP addresses.  A second computer in the border inspection station would receive the 
shunted packets, allowing content to be examined or whatever other action was 
determined to be legally appropriate.  To be effective all inspection station routers would 
need to have the same list of IP addresses input into the routing tables.  Thus if an IP 
address was determined through legal means to be subject to inspection, something like 
an Internet border inspection “all points bulletin” would be sent to all the various 
inspection stations and the rules for the routers would be updated.  The “all points 
bulletin” notifying the inspection stations of the new suspicious IP address could be sent 
through administrative channels; and personnel at the inspection station who have 
physical access to the router could update the router rules.  Then each inspection station 
router would shunt all traffic from that IP address to the appropriate secondary inspection 
station computer for more detailed inspection processing.  Internet border inspection 
routers in conjunction with secondary inspection station computers could be effectively 
used to efficiently and effectively inspect traffic from predetermined IP addresses coming 
across the border (see Figure 5).  The “all points bulletin” notifying the inspection 
stations of the new suspicious IP address could be sent through administrative channels; 
and personnel at the inspection station who have physical access to the router could 
update the router rules. 
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On a relatively smaller scale, certain elements of such a system are currently 
being used to protect at least one US government enterprise network.  The US Air Force 
uses routers at the borders of its network to block hostile source traffic similar to the 
manner described.  The router does not shunt aside traffic for inspections, but Air Force 
routers, on the “border” between the Air Force network and the rest of the Internet, 
routinely have new rules added and deleted to block or unblock specific IP addresses or 
address ranges.  The source IP addresses and address ranges selected to be blocked are 
those that have been the source of aggressive probes and other hostile hacking activity.  
There is of course a huge difference in scale between the network of one government 
agency and the entire US Internet backbone structure, but the routers used on the 
backbone networks are also necessarily orders of magnitude more powerful than those on 
even a large enterprise.  Routers are already handling the backbone traffic, and thus it is 
reasonable to consider that those at Internet border inspection stations could handle and 
route a limited list of IP addresses deemed appropriate for inspection or blocking. 
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One additional level of complexity can also be considered at this point.  It was 
mentioned in the previous chapter that different government agencies operate under 
different legal authorities and limitations.  Since routers can route to different 
destinations based on rules, the same router could be used to route different traffic to 
different secondary computers (See figure 6).  Legal due process would be used to 
determine if a government agency had legal authority to inspect certain traffic from 
specified IP addresses.  If the agency had that authority the router could be updated and 
traffic could be sent to one the appropriate secondary processing computer.  For example, 
if US Customs had information that child pornography was coming across the border 
from a specified IP address, they would update the router to allow traffic from the foreign 
IP address to only go to the secondary inspection station for US Customs.  If Law 
Enforcement had information that a hacker had exclusive use of a specific foreign IP 
address and was using it to cross the border and engage in hacking activity in the United 
States, they could obtain a warrant that would grant them legal authority to modify the 
routing tables so that the hacker’s traffic was routed to their inspection station. In 
practice, the inspection station router might be operated by an independent service 
provider, which would handle requests from the different government agencies in much 
the way that telecommunications providers respond to requests for subscriber 
information, pen registers, and content-based wiretaps, or it could be a new router owned 
and operated by the government.  The use of the router in this fashion would allow each 
agency to operate at the border under their appropriate authorities and limitations.  Thus 
each agency could assume appropriate responsibilities to protect the borders, and they 
could prevent or take counteractive measures against some portion of the hostile and 
criminal activity that comes into the United States from outside the border. 
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 Figure 6.   Alternate Conceptual Diagram of Traffic Passing Through Internet Border 
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Two primary technical issues have been dealt with here.  It can be seen that there 
is a significant concentration of Internet traffic from foreign countries, including traffic 
on trans-oceanic cables, into a reasonable number of routers that could serve as Internet 
border inspection stations.  Also, the primary inspection process has been described as 
router based with a second computer that would only examine traffic identified for 
secondary inspection.  Because routers already can perform the functions of routing 
based on IP header information such as IP addresses it is reasonable to suggest that 
routers on backbones with relatively minor modifications may feasibly work as a primary 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
56
V. LEGAL FEASIBILITY 
Although many of the legal aspects of Internet border inspections have been 
mentioned already, there are a few issues deserving a more detailed treatment.  This 
chapter will address constitutional feasibility and potential constitutional challenges.  The 
issue of how Internet border inspection would fit within the framework of existing 
international law will also be addressed.  Finally, even if the concept is not in conflict 
with either the Constitution or international law, it would still need explicit authorization 
through new legislation. While some of these ideas were mentioned in previous chapters 
this chapter will provide more detail and discuss the issues in direct relationship to legal 
feasibility. 
 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL FEASIBILITY 
Previously, the concept was discussed that Internet border inspection is a logical 
extension of the legal principles, such as national sovereignty, that allow physical border 
inspections.  National sovereignty is a principle that is not explicitly mentioned in the 
United States Constitution.  However the idea was definitely current at the time, and the 
Declaration of Independence alludes to this when it refers to the establishment of the 
United States as “…Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, 
conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and 
Things which Independent States may of right do.”  The Constitution describes these 
various powers and among all of these grants specifically to Congress the power “To 
regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations…”.  This power is particularly relevant to 
Government regulation of the borders.  This power has been held by various Supreme 
Court decisions to be very broadly applied, especially in cases governing the relationship 
of the Federal Government with regard to the individual states within the United States.  
One of the primary limitations on the authority to regulate commerce has arisen from 
individual rights of people within the borders of the United States. 
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Constitutionally vetted US law has already allowed appropriate agencies, which 
have jurisdiction at the border, broad authority to inspect based on the “commerce 
clause” and the various clauses that describe both the Legislative and Executive branch’s 
authority to protect the country from foreign threats.  It is considered legally significant 
that the “commerce clause” was part of the original text of the Constitution, and the 
Fourth Amendment was added later, with no specific mention of limiting Congressional 
authority “to regulate commerce”.  This is held to indicate that the framers of the 
Constitution intended the Federal government to have some additional authority at the 
border, including expanded authority to search.  This expanded authority has been 
codified into law, and the US Customs and Border Protection web page describes the 
statutes delegating this authority. 
The Congress of the United States has given the U.S. Customs Service 
broad authority to conduct searches of persons and their baggage, cargo, 
and means of transportation entering the United States.  This authority is 
contained in Title 19 of the United States Code, Sections 482, 1467, 1496, 
1581, and 1582.  
The courts have also held that this search, seizure, and arrest authority is 
not dependent upon either probable cause or a search warrant as is 
required by police officers.  One reason for this broad authority is the 
vulnerability of our borders to the illegal entry of a vast amount of 
dangerous and prohibited items.  
We endeavor to use this authority wisely and with respect for human 
dignity.  It is, however, the responsibility of a trained, professional 
Customs officer to determine the actual parameters of an examination.  
The officer is not permitted to release a traveler for entry into the U.S. 
until he or she is satisfied that no Customs or related Federal or State laws 
have been violated. 44 
Similarly the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services describe their authority. 
An inspector is responsible for determining the nationality and identity of 
each applicant for admission and for preventing the entry of ineligible 
aliens, including criminals, terrorists, and drug traffickers, among others. 
U.S. citizens are automatically admitted upon verification of citizenship; 
aliens are questioned and their documents are examined to determine 
admissibility based on the requirements of the U.S. immigration law.  
                                                 
44 US Customs Inspections - Right to Search.  http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/.  May 10, 2003. 
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Under the authority granted by the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), as amended, an Immigration Inspector may question, under oath, 
any person coming into the United States to determine his or her 
admissibility. In addition, an inspector has authority to search without 
warrant the person and effects of any person seeking admission, when 
there is reason to believe that grounds of exclusion exist which would be 
disclosed by such search.45 
Case law has upheld these authorities, indicating that the Government’s right to 
regulate commerce and protect the nation, outweigh the individual’s rights to be free 
from inspection at the narrow nexus of the border.  If the constitutional protections 
against unreasonable search and seizure, the right to due process, and other individual 
rights are not considered to be abrogated in physical border inspections, then it seems 
reasonable that appropriately narrow Internet border inspections should also survive a 
constitutional test.  However, this has not been tested in any court. 
 
B. POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
There are some ways that Internet border inspection could cross the threshold into 
unconstitutionality.  The two areas that must be carefully considered in design and 
implementation are IP address blocking and content examinations.  First we will consider 
the blocking of IP addresses.  As was previously described, it seems reasonable that the 
government has a legitimate interest in potentially blocking contraband like child 
pornography from crossing the border.  However, blocks must be applied narrowly so 
that computers with IP addresses hosting political, religious, or other types of recognized 
protected speech are not also blocked.  If the same foreign computer hosted both 
contraband and protected material, then instead of just blocking the foreign IP address, all 
traffic from the suspicious IP address might be sent to secondary inspection where it 
would be examined before being allowed to pass.  Examination could include an 
examination by a Customs official, or it could be aided by automated analysis that could 
compare incoming files against a database of known contraband files.  Law Enforcement 
agencies already have such databases of child pornography images and an automated 
means for conducting such comparisons.  If any contraband were found during 
                                                 
45  Immigration Inspection Program authority.  http://www.immigration.gov/. May 10, 2003. 
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inspection, requests for contraband material could be passed to law enforcement, 
following a cyberspace parallel of the “plain view” legal doctrine, which allows material 
found in the course of a legal search to be used in other law enforcement actions.  Any 
legitimate material that was found in secondary inspection would be allowed to pass with 
an effort to minimize interruption of traffic.  This may result in delays that would 
interrupt interactive sessions like chat, or even web access, but only to and from the 
suspicious IP address.  All traffic from non-suspicious IP addresses would of course go 
by without any interruption at all.  The fact that there would be some interruption from 
suspicious IP addresses would create an incentive for operators of foreign host computers 
to not provide contraband material.   
Other IP addresses that the government has a legitimate interest in blocking are 
host computers that are the source of hostile hacking activity.  Since almost any computer 
is potentially subject to compromise, it could serve as a pass through point for hackers.  
Appropriate international legal coordination and investigation would be among the first 
legal responses before blocking, but especially for countries that do not provide adequate 
legal cooperation, blocking would be an appropriate recourse.  Some legitimate material 
might be made unavailable until hostile activity ceased to originate from that host, but the 
primary intent would clearly be to stop hostile activity and not to block access to 
legitimate material.  Thus there would be an incentive for operators of foreign sites to 
have adequate security policies and measures so their materials can enter the US.  It is 
important to recognize that blocking intended to deny access to legitimate protected 
material, rather than blocking to prevent entry of contraband or malicious activity, could 
cross a constitutionally protected threshold, but reasonable and narrow blocks should pass 
constitutional muster. 
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The second area that could make Internet border inspection constitutionally 
challengeable is in the examination of content.  This issue has largely been addressed in 
the description of the primarily IP-based inspection regime.  If Internet inspection were 
primarily based on an examination of all content, or content in which there was no 
reasonable grounds for suspicion, then it would possibly be considered too intrusive into 
individual privacy.  By examining content only from suspicious IP addresses, most 
legitimate traffic goes by unhindered and unexamined.  This method seems to strike a 
reasonable balance between allowing some inspection for legitimate government 
purposes and protecting legitimate rights to privacy.  Legitimate and narrow blocking and 
content examination are reasonable and should be constitutional. 
 
C. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Even if Internet border inspection would survive a constitutional test there are 
other legal realms where it could be blocked.  The most important area that should be 
considered is international law or treaties.  Treaties that are ratified become the law of the 
United States and may hold the US Government to standards that may not be as 
amendable as domestic law.  The most prominent agreement that the United States has 
participated in negotiating with respect to the Internet is the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime.  This treaty does not specifically mention the idea of Internet 
border inspection, and the idea was likely not considered at all during negotiation.  
However, a section of the treaty requires signatory states “to empower its competent 
authorities to: collect or record through application of technical means on the territory of 
that Party…”46 This provision of the convention was not likely originally drafted with the 
intent of describing border inspections, but the language gives one example from the 
treaty showing that collection of traffic by competent authority was intended, and not 
prohibited.  There is some language in the treaty that describes the importance of privacy 
concerns.  However a reasonable analysis of the overall language of the treaty would 
indicate that as long as reasonable measures by competent authorities are taken, to ensure 
due process and a normal respect for individual rights, there should be no conflict 
between the treaty and the implementation of Internet border inspection.  It is important 
to also note that even though the United States participated in negotiations leading to the 
writing the Convention, the US Government has not formally signed the treaty nor 
ratified it at this time. 
                                                 
46 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.   http://conventions.coe.int. May 10, 2003. 
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 D. NEW LEGISLATION 
An additional area to consider regarding legal feasibility is the need for 
appropriate new authorizing and funding legislation.  Internet border inspections could 
not be implemented without legislation specifically granting such inspections.  Congress 
would have to identify an appropriate agency to be responsible for conducting the 
inspections, and then would have to explicitly grant inspection authority to that agency.  
Since setting up and maintaining Internet border inspection stations would also require 
computing resources and personnel, specific budget authorizations would also have to be 
passed.  The process of actually passing the authorizing and funding legislation would be 
necessary before any Internet inspection could take place, and of course passing such 
legislation is by no means a trivial task.  The task of passing such laws, however, is 
primarily a political question and not a question of legal feasibility.  The issues of 
political feasibility will be addressed in the next chapter.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
We can conclude from the preceding analysis that appropriately narrow Internet 
border inspection can reasonably be considered a part of legitimate government interests 
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and to protect the United States from criminal 
and national security threats.  Also, such inspections are not in conflict with current 
treaties dealing with the Internet.  If inspections were explicitly authorized in new 
legislation they are likely to be legally feasible.  
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VI. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY ISSUES 
The idea of Internet border inspection is not simply addressed as a narrow 
technical or legal question.  The Internet is multifaceted, and a host of entities have 
specific interests in both how the Internet changes and stays the same.  The amount of 
actual and potential commerce has brought the Internet to the attention of corporations 
and businesses large and small, but significant commerce always brings with it the 
interest of governments as well.  The Internet is also a huge edifice of knowledge, 
perhaps one of the largest collections of human thought and energy in history.  This fact 
combined with the reality that the Internet is also a major communications medium, 
together bring in the interest of millions of individuals and organizations.  The 
communications and knowledge aspects also attract the interest of both business and 
government.  Any time there is such a diversity of interests, political issues emerge which 
must be addressed.  This chapter will discuss some of these issues as they relate to 
Internet border inspections.    
Discussion of political issues related to this topic cannot be addressed in the same 
way as technical or legal questions.  Technical questions generally can be answered in a 
fairly definitive fashion as either currently possible or more or less potentially feasible.  
Legal questions have a significantly larger amount of judgment in them, but still there are 
going to be some things that are clearly on one side of legality or the other.   
Political issues, though, have an essentially different character.  Implementation 
of an idea may be practically impossible in one political context, and then a single event 
may fundamentally shift the political situation, opening a window of political opportunity 
for a relatively brief time.  If political leaders do not take that opportunity to make a 
significant change, then the window of opportunity may not open again for decades, if 
ever.  Other political ideas develop as more of a product of larger historical and social 
forces that make realization almost inevitable.  Political issues can also be influenced by 
almost completely unrelated political and social events.  With this type of complexity one 
cannot speak of political feasibility with the same precision as technical and legal 
feasibility.  This chapter will thus not necessarily prescribe solutions to all of the political 
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issues, but it will try at least to identify some of the key issues affecting successful 
implementation.   
There are at least five issues that would have to be addressed to sufficiently 
satisfy appropriate interest groups concerned about the implementation of Internet border 
inspection.  These are: concerns about freedom of speech and privacy, need for proper 
legal oversight, concerns of international actors, comparisons with other nations that have 
implemented restrictions on the Internet, and concerns about cost and necessity. 
 
A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRIVACY 
Freedom of speech and privacy issues were discussed briefly in the chapter on 
legal feasibility.  However, there is much more to protecting these rights than just a 
theoretical test of constitutionality.  Just because something is not prohibited in the 
Constitution does not necessarily mean that it should be implemented.  Government may 
have the authority under the Constitution to take a number of actions that Americans 
would prefer the government not actually put into practice.  Issues related to privacy can 
easily fall into this category.  Privacy groups watch for changes in law and society that 
impact privacy.  They pay attention to changes related to Government monitoring on the 
Internet, and they would likely be interested in discussions about Internet border 
inspection.  It is important to have people that pay attention to such issues and advocate 
the protection of privacy.  Such concerns should be taken seriously, but also must be 
weighed against the reasonable interests and responsibilities of the US Government to 
protect the people, commerce, intellectual property, information, and computers within 
the borders of the United States on behalf of the people.  There are significant interests at 
stake, which need to be properly balanced.  The IP address based approach of inspecting 
at the border seeks to start the discussion near that balancing point.   
There will be some who may never be convinced of a need for Internet inspection 
at the border.  Some privacy advocates may feel that they have a role to oppose any 
additional government authority to inspect on the Internet whether it is reasonable or 
otherwise.  It will be up to Congress and the Executive branch to ultimately consider 
detailed proposals and balance the protection roles of government.  The Judicial branch 
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will ensure that proper authority is not being overstepped.  And it will ultimately be up to 
the citizenry to see and support a proper balance of privacy and protection.  There is 
some reasonable government role in protection of the borders on the Internet, and even 
privacy advocates can be part of a reasonable solution.  This issue can hopefully be dealt 
with through reasonable dialog rather than polarizing arguments.  One of the important 
ways advocates for increased protection at the border can approach the issue is by clearly 
articulating the reasonable and legitimate interests of the government and the people in 
protecting the border, and by emphasizing the narrow nature of the inspections.  
Reasonable people are likely to find the argument for some narrow protection at the 
borders on the Internet to be legitimate. 
Freedom of speech advocates are also likely to be concerned about the ability to 
block legitimate Internet traffic.  It is good and appropriate that there are people who pay 
attention to such issues.  It is precisely the handling of this issue and ensuring that 
protected speech is handled properly that will separate this implementation from the 
methods taken by authoritarian regimes.  This issue can be addressed by taking due 
consideration of the issue and again finding the proper balance of protecting free speech 
and security, and explaining this to both citizens and decision makers.  Neither privacy 
nor free speech issues should prevent a reasonable implementation of Internet border 
inspection. 
B. NEED FOR PROPER OVERSIGHT 
Internet border inspection could be abused to gather improper information or 
interfere with free speech.  Proper oversight is key to preventing abuse.  Congress and the 
Executive branch should consider, along with other implementation measures, the proper 
methods to ensure sufficient oversight is conducted without being overly burdensome.  
Privacy Officers are one approach that some government agencies and even business 
sector organizations are using to ensure privacy protection.  Congressional oversight also 
could be used, especially during the stages of early implementation, to ensure that the 
institution of Internet border inspections starts off with the right precedents, and 
maintained as appropriate.   
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Oversight can include more than just external oversight.  It can include training.  
A properly implemented and rigorous training program would teach all employees the 
proper uses and limits of information gathered during the course of inspections.  Rigorous 
initial training, plus regular refresher training, can help prevent abuses in the first place 
and reduce the need for other oversight bodies to take corrective action.  An example of a 
similar training program is the intelligence community’s Intelligence Oversight training.  
The training program includes rigorous initial training and then annual refresher training.  
With this program personnel routinely police themselves and co-workers to ensure no 
improper intelligence is collected.  A similarly rigorous program would go far in helping 
to build confidence that Internet border inspection would be used for only legitimate and 
reasonable purposes.   
In addition to proper oversight, appropriate consideration should be given to 
dealing with complaints.  A foreign host computer might have been blocked due to its 
being the source of criminal activity crossing the border into the United States.  If the 
operator of the host computer had taken appropriate corrective action they might be 
interested in having the block removed.  For example a foreign web site might be blocked 
because is contained child pornography, or had been compromised and used by hackers 
as an intermediate launching platform for subsequent hacking activity.  If the operators of 
the host computer had taken the contraband material off of the host, or taking security 
measures to prevent it being used by hackers a means should be considered for requesting 
a block to be removed.  Also if someone in the United States had been denied access to a 
foreign host computer they also might be interested in inquiring about the block.  For 
example a researcher might routinely go to hacker web sites to gain insights into hacker 
methods and intentions.  A means should be considered to allow for appropriate inquiries 
about the nature of the block, and a means established for petitioning removal of such a 
block in appropriate circumstances.   
 
C. CONCERNS OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
The United States has an overwhelmingly dominant position on the Internet.  
Other nations that have a prominent interest in the Internet already recognize this fact.  In 
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many ways they may see the largely unrestricted nature of the Internet as a way in which 
they can participate without undue US influence.  Even the hint of the US putting up 
significant border controls would represent one more way that the US could influence the 
Internet at large.  The idea of merely being able to monitor traffic at the borders, or 
implement information embargos, could easily send even some allies into quick 
opposition.  Because the United States holds such a large lead in the physical 
infrastructure capacity of the Internet, there is a very significant portion of the traffic 
passing between other countries that passes at some point through the US.  If the United 
States blocked even a single IP address from crossing the border, a large portion of the 
Internet both in and outside the US would be potentially unable to reach that address.  
Traffic within a given region, such as Europe, may be unaffected, but a significant 
amount of traffic passing between points in Asia and Europe could be affected; 
exchanges that pass from one region to another could be similarly impacted.  This would 
give the United States significant potential power that it does not currently possess.  In a 
world where other powers both great and small already see the US as overwhelmingly 
dominant, any significant increase in its power could be seen as a threat.  The United 
States would have to show that this power would be handled responsibly, to gain the 
support of allies, and that properly implemented it could deter crime and increase security 
for all nations that seek to conduct legitimate activity on the Internet.   
 
D. CONCERNS ABOUT OTHER NATIONAL SYSTEMS  
Some people are likely at first, to consider Internet border inspection as being too 
similar to the illiberal structures that authoritarian regimes have established within their 
borders to restrict access to the Internet.  A reasonable and careful consideration of the 
proposed inspections will show that the proposed controls have a fundamentally different 
nature and purpose than the controls put in place by authoritarian regimes.  Several 
countries have established controls for the purpose of limiting access by their people to 
political or religious speech.  Among these countries are China, Cuba, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Burma, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.47  China has 
                                                 
47 S. Kalathil and T.C. Boas, Open networks, closed regimes: the impact of the Internet on authoritarian rule. 
2003, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 9. 
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implemented a system that has garnered perhaps the most attention, and it has been 
referred to by some as the “Great Firewall of China”.  Internet border inspection as 
described in this thesis is not equivalent to the “Great Firewall of China”.  China arrests 
individuals for expressing antigovernment views online, and members of groups like the 
Falun Gong are sent to reeducation camps for sharing information over the Internet.48  
While the United States might use inspection to block access to child pornography, which 
is considered contraband by most of the developed world, China uses its system to block 
access to Falun Gong websites outside their borders.49  Legitimate free speech is 
protected in the United States, but the same type of speech is not protected in China.  
There may be a few technical similarities between the systems, but the purposes are 
fundamentally different, and to equate them as the same misses this vital point.  If this 
difference is properly highlighted, reasonable people will be able to understand and 
accept Internet border inspection, while still opposing improper use by authoritarian 
regimes. 
 
E. COST AND NECESSITY 
Some people will be concerned about the cost and necessity of such a project.  
Understanding the threat on the Internet is key to understanding why border inspection is 
a reasonable measure and potentially worth the costs involved.  The Carnegie Mellon 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was originally set up to coordinate 
computer emergency incident information on the Internet for DARPA.  According to 
CERT statistics, computer incidents have shown a steadily increasing trend since 1990, 
with a dramatic increase every year since 1998. (See Figure 7).50   
                                                 
48 Ibid. p. 13. 
49 Ibid. p. 13. 
50 CERT Statistics. www.cert.org. June 3, 2003. 
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Figure 7.   Computer Incidents 
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With such a rise in computer incidents, computer security has taken on a new 
importance for anyone connected to the Internet.  Internet border inspection will not be a 
panacea for correcting all of these ills.  There are a many other measures that should be 
taken which organizations like CERT recommend.  The US Government has also 
developed in partnership with the private sector and academia a National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace.  This strategy recommends measures that should be taken at all levels 
to enhance security.  “Securing cyberspace is a difficult strategic challenge that requires 
coordinated and focused effort from our entire society, the federal government, state and 
local governments, the private sector, and the American people.”51  These efforts cannot 
be replaced by Internet inspection, but such inspection could complement them, and close 
a gap that is currently wide open at the border.  Only the Federal government could 
implement such measures, and the Federal government has a reasonable and legitimate 
interest in providing some additional level of security at the borders on the Internet.   
As an example, we can compare security on the Internet with other physical 
homeland security measures established to prevent crime and terrorism.  Adequate 
homeland security must be a partnership between the private sector and government.  
                                                 
51 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/.  June 3, 2003. 
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Individuals and each organization must implement appropriate physical security 
measures, based on a reasonable evaluation of the threat of crime or terrorism.  Likewise 
adequate cyber-security calls upon individuals and businesses to deploy appropriate 
computer security measures based on the daily threat.  The US government, however, 
does not leave physical security up to the individual or business alone.  It also takes 
reasonable measures at a national level including physical border searches, looking for 
guns or bombs, to reduce the threat coming into the country in the first place.  It is 
reasonable to conclude that there is some appropriate role that the government could play 
at the national borders on the Internet as well.   
It was mentioned earlier that some political issues are best addressed when events 
open a political window of opportunity, and there are other issues that are shaped by 
larger historical forces making them almost inevitable.  Internet border security may fit 
both categories.  There is currently a heightened sense of awareness of security 
throughout the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.  This heightened security awareness may allow both government leaders and the 
common citizen to understand the logic of Internet border inspection more easily.  Thus 
there is a current window of opportunity to take such action.   
However there are larger historical forces at work as well.  The trends toward 
more people connecting to the Internet every year (see Figure 8), and the dramatic 
increases in computer incidents, show that it may be just a matter of time before some 
security measures have to be taken at the border on the Internet.   
Figure 8.   Estimate of total population on-line as of September 2002 
World Total 605.60 million 
Africa 6.31 million 
Asia/Pacific 187.24 million 
Europe 190.91 million 
Middle East 5.12 million 
Canada & USA 182.67 million 
Latin America 33.35 million 
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The Internet was developed and grew as a largely borderless small and specialized 
communications medium.  It has developed, since its early years, into a major 
communications medium, and now represents a very large and growing financial interest.  
The need for increased security for such a large and important collection of information 
and financial interests has made it a legitimate interest of government.  There is no reason 
to expect this trend to reverse, and little reason to believe it will slow down any time 
soon.  If one of the fundamental functions of government is to provide security, then it is 
not unreasonable to describe increasing assertion of national sovereignty on the Internet 
as inevitable.  If nations will increasingly assert their sovereignty, then border inspection 
is a reasonable area of discussion.  As was pointed out earlier, authoritarian regimes have 
already asserted similar prerogatives on the Internet.  It seems that instead of letting their 
abuse of the authority be an argument for not asserting reasonable measures, the United 
States should set a positive example of how such measures can be narrowly applied for 
legitimate purposes.  The United States has used its dominant power for good in many 
ways.  For example, the dominant naval power of the United States keeps the oceans of 
the world more secure for everyone, except pirates and criminals.  Even if the United 
States has a dominant role on the Internet, this can also be for the benefit of everyone 
except criminals.   
F. CONCLUSION 
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There are several important political considerations that must be adequately 
addressed if Internet border inspection is to be considered feasible.  Some of the most 
prominent have been mentioned here; others may surface as the concept is explored 
further.  Internet border inspection represents a significant if not dramatic increase in 
potential US government authority and power on the Internet.  It is vital that any concrete 
proposal be designed to appropriately address political concerns before implementation.  
The proposal needs to be adequately explained to the public, and all interested parties 
given the opportunity to express their views.  There needs to be an understanding of the 
threats on the Internet, and the legitimate interests of government to take measures, like 
border inspection, which could provide enhanced security for many even outside US 
borders.  If the proposal is well designed and adequately understood, a majority of 


























This thesis has introduced and explored the concept of Internet border inspections. 
This final chapter will describe some findings and policy implications that have not been 
fully examined elsewhere in this thesis, and will also describe some recommendations for 
further study. 
A. FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Implementing Internet border inspections would have important implications.  
There would be significant impacts on the Internet itself, and there would be political and 
diplomatic impacts inside and outside the United States.  One impact would be a 
fundamental shift away from thinking of the Internet as borderless.  Some nations have 
already installed controls within their own countries, but they are generally considered 
authoritarian and not a major presence for content on the Internet.  Inspection could 
change that perception.  However, in other ways the United States could set a strong and 
positive precedent on the Internet.  The US may be able to bring some order out of the 
common chaos and lawlessness that is currently a fact of life in cyberspace.  If the 
Internet were better policed, it could potentially enhance growth and stability on the 
Internet, in a fashion similar to the way that the US providing security in international 
waters enhances and stabilizes world trade.  Hackers and virus writers can be likened to 
the pirates of cyberspace.  In the current environment, it is taken for granted that they 
cannot be tracked or significantly hindered except through laborious and often dead end 
law enforcement actions, but new tools like Internet border protection and inspection 
could provide a way of isolating them and bringing order to the Internet.  Software and 
media pirates, who also operate with very little inhibition on the Internet currently, could 
also find their means of distribution blocked to major markets for gaining and distributing 
their illegal goods.   
The United States government had been successful in tracking down and almost 
eliminating child pornography from crossing the border when the primary means was 
physical print media.  This success reached its apex at about the same time the Internet 
was becoming accessible to the general public.  The Internet became the new media of 
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choice to engage in child pornography distribution.  The borderless nature of the current 
Internet is exactly the environment that distributors of such contraband prefer.  Internet 
border inspection and blocking could provide new investigative tools that could help stem 
the tide of child pornography that crosses the borders of the United States daily.   
Once there is a means of performing reasonable inspections and protections at the 
border of the Internet, additional measures could be taken to make the Internet a safer 
environment.  The idea of border inspections should not be dismissed out of hand based 
on the fear of potential abuse.  In the future, Internet border inspection may be considered 
as natural, routine, and harmless as physical border inspections, which are assumed to be 
a basic part of protecting people and business inside countries, around the world. 
 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION 
There are several issues that should be given additional consideration in future 
analysis and discussion of Internet border inspection.   
Routers can be used to parse traffic based on almost any of the normal header 
information.  This includes protocols, ports, and services.  One idea, briefly mentioned in 
Chapter III, was the idea that certain traffic could be taken out of the normal stream based 
on the service rather than the IP address alone.  This may be valuable to Customs 
authorities if they identify services used to traffic in information goods such as software, 
movies, and music.  The practical ways for implementing this in the context of Internet 
border inspection should be explored. 
Another issue which was briefly touched on in the discussions of legal jurisdiction 
was the potential role and authority of the Department of Defense to defend the United 
States against an information warfare attack launched during a time of war or hostilities.  
Whether this role is minor or significant has yet to be determined.  However, it would 
have been unthinkable when the United States was young to not have military 
fortifications to protect the major routes of commerce along the borders from potential 
invasion or attack from armies and navies in their day.  The idea of the cyber-
fortifications at the border may make more sense as cyber warfare is developed outside 
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US borders.   This should also be considered further in the context of Internet border 
protection.   
Chapter III described Internet services comparable to people crossing the border 
unchecked.  These services, which include Telnet and Secure Shell, represent a relatively 
small portion of the total Internet traffic.  However, because they are one of the major 
ways that hackers gain access to victim computers to conduct their crimes, additional 
consideration could be given to the idea of requiring individuals using these services to 
hold a cyber equivalent of a passport or visa when crossing the border into the United 
States.   Routers are able to block based on a service and not just an IP address.  This 
might mean that a new IP service, like Telnet, would be created requiring additional 
authentication to conduct system administration across borders, and the normal Telnet 
and Secure Shell services might not be allowed to cross the border.  Significant additional 
thought would be needed to fully develop such a concept. 
There is one additional area deserving further consideration.  More thought should 
be given to how the proposal for Internet border inspections should be discussed and 
developed.  Additional discussion and development could be done in conjunction with 
allies or even in an international forum, or it could be conducted entirely within the 
United States.  Once it was developed it could be offered to other countries, or efforts 
could be made to keep it within the United States.  Each approach would have short-term 
ramifications and potentially long term impacts as well.  If it were implemented in a 
balanced and narrow way in conjunction with other nations that respected individual 
rights, it could enhance security for all nations including the United States, but there are 
many other aspects to consider in this discussion.  This issue warrants additional 
exploration.   
C. CONCLUSION 
The idea of Internet border inspection and protection is multifaceted.  It includes 
technical, legal, and political aspects that could be areas for significant exploration in 
themselves.  With proper consideration, this idea may prove a fertile source for further 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
76
APPENDIX A – TITLES OF UNITED STATES CODE 
 
Title 1, General Provisions  
Title 2, The Congress  
Title 3, The President  
Title 4, Flag and Seal, Seat of Government, and the States  
Title 5, Government Organization and Employees; and Appendix  
Title 6, Surety Bonds (Repealed)  
Title 7, Agriculture  
Title 8, Aliens and Nationality  
Title 9, Arbitration  
Title 10, Armed Forces; and Appendix  
Title 11, Bankruptcy; and Appendix  
Title 12, Banks and Banking  
Title 13, Census  
Title 14, Coast Guard  
Title 15, Commerce and Trade  
Title 16, Conservation  
Title 17, Copyrights  
Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure; and Appendix  
Title 19, Customs Duties  
Title 20, Education  
Title 21, Food and Drugs  
Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse  
Title 23, Highways  
Title 24, Hospitals and Asylums  
Title 25, Indians  
Title 26, Internal Revenue Code; and Appendix  
Title 27, Intoxicating Liquors  
Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure; and Appendix  
Title 29, Labor  
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Title 30, Mineral Lands and Mining  
Title 31, Money and Finance  
Title 32, National Guard  
Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters  
Title 34, Navy (Repealed)  
Title 35, Patents  
Title 36, Patriotic Societies and Observances  
Title 37, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services  
Title 38, Veterans' Benefits; and Appendix  
Title 39, Postal Service  
Title 40, Public Buildings, Property, and Works; and Appendix  
Title 41, Public Contracts  
Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare  
Title 43, Public Lands  
Title 44, Public Printing and Documents  
Title 45, Railroads  
Title 46, Shipping; and Appendix  
Title 47, Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs  
Title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions  
Title 49, Transportation  
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